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The Prosecutor's Duty To Truth 
Years ago, when I became a prosecutor, I was trained to believe that you never 
put a defendant to trial unless you were personally convinced of his guilt. This 
was, as I recall, the accepted ethos in our office and, I assumed, in prosecutors' 
offices generally.' I never questioned that precept. Some years later, however, I 
had an opportunity to test it when I prepared to go to trial in a robbery case. The 
defendant, a twenty-year-old black man, was accused of robbing at gunpoint a 
seventy-seven-year-old white man in a housing project. The complainant 
identified the defendant from photographs and later picked him out from a lineup 
containing two other persons, one of whom was a police officer known to the 
complainant. There was no other evidence. 
In readying the case for trial, I learned that the defendant had been getting into 
trouble ever since he had dropped out of high school. He had been arrested 
several times, but the charges had been dismissed. He had acquired a reputation 
with the Housing Police, who frequently picked him up for questioning. He had 
been convicted of robbery two years earlier and had served three months in 
prison. Several days after he came home, the Housing Police picked him up again 
in connection with the present robbery. He had been in jail for the past fourteen 
months awaiting trial. 
I was concerned about the reliability of the identification. In addition to the 
suggestive lineup, the complainant's initial description of the defendant - he 
told the police that his assailant was about five feet four inches tall - differed 
markedly from the defendant's actual height of six feet two inches. I interviewed 
the complainant and questioned him closely. He was an intelligent man who gave 
a convincing account of the event. A jury, I thought, would probably believe him. 
I went to the vestibule where the crime occurred; it was well-lit, a circumstance 
supporting the accuracy of the identification. I talked to the janitor who had 
initially called the police and to several tenants. I learned nothing useful. The 
defendant's lawyer protested his client's innocence, but offered no alibi. Lacking 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I would like to thank Adele Bernhard, David Dorfrnan, Steven 
Goldberg, Vanessa Merton, John Humbach, Steven Zeidrnan, and especially Lissa Griffin, for their thoughtful 
comments. 
1 .  I served as an Assistant in the Office of Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County, from 
1966 to 1972, and as a Special Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Maurice H. Nadjari, Deputy Attorney 
General for New York State, from 1973 to 1976. 
Heinonline 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 309 20002001 
[Vol. 14:309 
corroboration of the complainant's identification and aware of the inherent 
dangers of eyewitness identifications, I suggested that the defendant take a lie 
detector test. He passed. 
The day before trial, I asked the complainant to come to my office. I asked 
him to look at a series of about twenty photographs of similarly appearing 
males that I spread out on my desk. I had the investigator place two 
photographs of the defendant in the array. I left my office, asking the 
complainant to examine the photographs carefully and pick out the man who 
robbed him. When I returned five minutes later, he had selected a photograph 
of someone else; he was sure that was the person. I asked him to do it again. 
Again he picked out someone else. I thanked him. I explained to him that I 
could not prosecute the case. As I recall, he seemed to understand. My bureau 
chief concurred. I prepared a motion to dismiss, which the judge, expressing 
some reluctance, granted.2 
Some years later, now a law professor, and increasingly exposed to academic 
perspectives on the ethical responsibilities of "virtuous"  prosecutor^,^ I was 
surprised to learn that several of these commentators believe that it is not the 
prosecutor's function to make a personal evaluation of the truth; it is the jury's 
functiom4 Offering a hypothetical one-eyewitness-identification case strikingly 
similar to my own robbery case, one influential author asked rhetorically how a 
conscientious prosecutor could ever rationally reach the "extra-judicial judg- 
2. The case is reported in Joel Dreyfuss, An Innocent Man S 14 Lost Months, N .  Y. POST, June 3, 1971, at 5. 
3. See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance From the 
ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988). See also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?", 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
4. The seminal article is Uviller, supra note 3, at 1159 ("[Wlhen the issue stands in equipoise in 
his own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in 
the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the judge or jury"). But see H. 
Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2000) ("The prosecutor should be assured to a fairly high degree of 
certainty that he has the right person."). See also Fisher, supra note 3, at 230 n. 144 ("The prevailing view, 
at least in the world of practice, surely permits prosecutors to [proceed absent personal belief in the 
defendant's guilt]."); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 94 (suggesting that "prosecutors need not act as judges of 
their witness's testimony unless they are sure the witness is falsifying facts"). For contrary views, see 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 88 (1975) (criticizing Professor 
Uviller's approach and maintaining that "[a] prosecutor should be professionally disciplined for 
proceeding with prosecution if a fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to 
the prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial 
Discretion - A Comment, 60  NW. U.L. REV. 174, 178 (1965) (discussing his experience as an Assistant 
United states Attorney, the author states: "The great majority, if not all, of the assistants felt that it was 
morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one was personally convinced of his guilt."); Whitney North 
Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956) (noting 
that the "decision [to prosecute] is reached only after we have satisfied ourselves of the defendant's actual 
guilt"). 
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ment" that the witness is ~nreliable.~ The prosecutor's ethical obligations are 
satisfied, according to this view, if he apprises the court or defense counsel of 
adverse evidence or defects in the truthfulness of his witne~ses.~ 
My unease with this agnostic approach might have remained dormant were it 
not for recent events and disclosures that invite, if not compel, a re-examination 
of the question of the prosecutor's obligation to the truth. It has always been my 
belief that the prosecutor, more than any other government official, possesses the 
greatest power to take away a person's liberty or life at his discretion.' Also, it is 
5. See Uviller, supra note 3, at 1157-58 ("Indeed, should the conscientious prosecutor set himself the arduous 
task of deciding whether in this instance the complainant is right? If it is his duty to do so, how does he rationally 
reach a conclusion? For this purpose, are his mental processes superior to the jurors' or the judge's?'). 
6. See id. at 1159. In this Article, I make no pretense to try to grapple with the epistological meaning of 
"truth." See SISSELA BOK, LYING 5 (1989) ("'Truth' - no concept intimidates and yet draws thinkers so 
powerfully. From the beginnings of human speculation about the world, the questions of what truth is and 
whether we can attain it have loomed large."). My reference to "truth" in criminal law includes two separate 
concepts - the "factual truth" and the "legal truth." See Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and 
Facrfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1084-87 (1975) (discussing difference between factual truth, 
which includes external facts derived from witness's sensory experience and internal facts relating to aspects of 
defendant's knowledge and volition, and legal truth, which includes the.need to assess the external and internal 
facts in light of the legal appropriate standard). For purposes of my discussion, factual truth includes all of the 
operative facts probative of the historical criminal event, including external and internal facts; legal truth is the 
legal consequence of those facts. Neither of these truths, of course, is ever free of ambiguity or obscurity, even 
in the best circumstances. It is rarely possible for a prosecutor or anyone else to ever h o w  the "whole truth," but 
a prosecutor should have some degree of confidence in the factual and legal truth of his case before proceeding 
to trial. The focus of this Article is to assess the level of confidence that a prosecutor should possess before 
proceeding with a case. 
So, for example, in a murder case, factual truth would include all of the facts and circumstances relevant to 
the defendant's act of killing. Some of these facts may be unknown or disputed, such as whether the defendant 
had been drinking prior to the encounter, whether he canied a gun with him or went home to retrieve it, and 
whether the victim attacked him first. The critical factual question would be the defendant's mental state at the 
moment of the killing: did he kill from rage, from drink, in self-defense, or from a premeditated design? Only an 
answer to the latter question would determine the legal truth, namely, whether the defendant is guilty of first 
degree murder, some lesser degree of homicide, or not guilty. The prosecutor's duty to truth embraces both the 
factual and legal truth. 
For recent illustrations of problems encountered by prosecutors in ascertaining the truth, see James Sterngold, 
Nuclear Scientist Set Free After Plea in Secrets Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A1 (judge accuses 
prosecution of presenting false and misleading evidence that defendant engaged in conduct that posed threat to 
national security); Katherine E. Finkelstein, Prosecutors Detail Evidence Leading to Suspect's Release, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2000, at B3 (noting that despite defendant's confession and two eyewitness identifications, 
prosecutor claims police arrested wrong man); Kevin Sack & David Firestone, Tough Times for Prosecutor In 
an Atlanta Murder Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,2000, at A20 (recounting how the prosecution against professional 
football star Ray Lewis crumbled as witnesses changed stories); Alan Feuer, OlgicerS Role in Louima Case 
Elusive, Even After Verdicts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,2000, at B 1 (describing the "frustrating sense that the truth - 
cold and hard and clean - remains elusive" after two federal trials of three New York City police officers 
charged with assaulting a prisoner, Abner Louima, and then attempting to cover up their misconduct); see also 
United States v. Volpe, 62 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying motion to set aside verdict in Louima case 
based on factual insufficiency). 
7. See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987) ("Between the private life of the citizen and the 
public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full 
machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual."); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1555 (1981) ("Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny 
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becoming increasingly clear that the criminal justice system often miscarries, 
almost always with tragic r e ~ u l t s . ~  Numerous documented instances of wrongful 
convictions, particularly in death penalty cases, have heightened concern about 
the ability of the criminal trial process to produce truthful  result^.^ The Governor 
of Illinois recently called for a moratorium on executions after thirteen men on 
death row were proven innocent.'' Of the 6,000 people sent to death row since 
1973, eighty-four of them have been exonerated." According to a U.S. 
Department of Justice report, at least fifty-five defendants who were convicted 
and incarcerated for lengthy periods have been exonerated by DNA evidence.I2 A 
punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed 
arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least favored members of the community - racial and ethnic minorities, 
social outcasts, the poor - will be treated most harshly."). There is a vast amount of scholarship on the 
prosecutor's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981); FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A 
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in rhe United States, 18 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 532 (1970); Charles Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 (1960); 
see also Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard For the Prosecuror's Exercise of the Charging Discrefion, 20 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 513, 513 (1993) ("[Nlo subject in criminal law is as elusive as that of prosecutorial 
discretion in the charging process."). 
8. See, e.g., JAMES LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (conducting a massive study of every capital punishment case in U.S. between 
1973-1995 that documents that the overall error rate in capital punishment system is 68%, and that 82% of all 
capital judgments reversed on appeal [247 out of 3011 were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or 
no sentence at all); JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACIIJAL INNOCENCE (2000) (providing a 
compendium of anecdotal accounts, and legal and social science scholarship, of miscarriages of justice in 
American criminal trials); The Death Penalty in 1999; Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 
1 (2000) (listing eighty-four inmates on Death Row exonerated since 1973); Marty Rosenbaum, Inevitable 
Error Wrongful New York State Homocide Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 807, 
809 (1991) (claiming that New York State leads all states in executing the innocent; eight New Yorkers have 
been executed in error); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36-37,7 1 (1987) (claiming that more than 350 people in this century have 
been erroneously convicted in the U.S. of crimes punishable by death; 116 of those were sentenced to death and 
twenty-three actually were executed); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, NOV. 1, 1999, at 
68 ("[Slurely the number of innocent people discovered and freed from prison is only a small fraction of those 
still incarcerated."). 
9. See Berlow, supra note 8. See also WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT RUTH 3 (1999) (describing 
American trial system as structurally flawed by badly overemphasizing winning and losing and undervaluing 
truth); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1996) (suggesting that 
trials are just as likely to hide or corrupt truth as to discover truth). 
10. See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.  
Legislation that would halt executions are pending in twelve other states. Id. 
11. See The Death Penalty in 1999: Year End Report, supra note 8. 
12. See Recommendations for Handling Applications for Posrconvicrion DNA Testing, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Draft Report), at 7 (Feb. 1999) ("[Alt least fifty-five convictions in the United States have 
been vacated on the basis of DNA results."). See also Edward Connors et al, Convicred by Juries, Exonerated by 
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence Ajier Trial, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUST. (1996) (evaluating twenty-eight cases in which DNA evidence established post-trial innocence). 
Congress is presently considering legislation that would mandate free DNA testing on application of a convicted 
defendant of any biological material in the government's possession related to the prosecution. See S. 2073, 
106th Cong. (2000). One local District Attorney has begun a policy of offering free DNA testing to prison 
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recent study reported that convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide have 
been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting the defen- 
dants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false.I3 Misidentifica- 
tions, false confessions, false testimony of informants and jailhouse "snitches," 
police perjury, and untruthful allegations of child sexual abuse are among the 
most frequently cited contributors to wrongful convictions. l4 
Curiously, despite extensive documentation of erroneous convictions, wide- 
spread prosecutorial abuses that contribute to wrongful convictions, and a 
plethora of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of  prosecutor^,'^ 
there has been little discussion of the prosecutor's legal and ethical duty to 
truth.16 As I hope to demonstrate, the prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to 
promote truth and to refrain from conduct that impedes truth. The courts have 
explicitly recognized the existence of this duty, l 7  and have implicitly recognized 
inmates who claim they were wrongfully convicted and would be exonerated by such testing. See James 
Sterngold, Sun Diego District Attorney Offering Free DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,2000, at A12. 
13. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 1999, at 3. 
14. See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 8; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 8, at 57 tbl. 6 (listing 
coerced or false confessions responsible for erroneous convictions in forty-nine out of 350 miscaniages of 
justice in potentially capital cases); Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117,2117 n.1 (1996) (claiming that of the thirty child sexual abuse cases that 
went to trial in thq 1980s, more than half of convictions were reversed on appeal for tainted testimony of child 
witnesses); Arye kattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289-92 (1988) (describing a study of more than 200 felony cases of wrongful 
conviction that found misidentification to be the single largest source of error, accounting for more than half of 
cases that had one main cause). The role of prosecutorial misconduct in contributing to miscarriages of justice is 
also well-documented. See LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of 
evidence accounted for 16% to 19% of reversible errors); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 13, at 2 (claiming 
381 homicide cases were reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting defendants' innocence or 
presented evidence known to be false); Rosenbaum. supra note 8, at 809 ("[A] substantial number of the 
wrongful convictions we have found in New York resulted from prosecutorial misconduct."); Bedau & Radelet, 
supra note 8, at 57 (asserting that fifty of the 350 wrongful convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression 
of exculpatory evidence or other overzealous prosecution). 
A significant contributor to wrongful convictions is the poor quality of defense lawyering. See, e.g., Stephen 
B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But For the Worst Lawyer, 103 
YALE L. J. 1835 (1994); Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5,2000, at Al .  
15. A recent Westlaw search turned up 178 law review articles in the last five years about prosecutorial ethics 
and fourteen law review symposia addressing that subject. 
16. But see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 633 (1998) (inquiring into appropriate standard of proof to 
guide prosecutors); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling 
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 953-57 (discussing attitudes of former federal prosecutors 
toward truth as "overriding concern" but "elusive"); David A. Sklansky, Starc Singleton, and the Prosecutor's 
Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 528-31 (noting failure of Justice Department to assign as a "relevant 
consideration" in determining whether to enter into plea agreement with defendant the prosecutor's "degree of 
confidence that the witness will testify honestly," and criticizing academic commentators for largely neglecting 
discussion of "how prosecutors should exercise the discretion they actually have."). 
17. See infra note 38. 
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this duty by reversing convictions when a prosecutor engages in conduct that 
undermines the search for truth.I8 
The prosecutor's duty to the truth arises from several sources. The most important 
source is the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice.Ig In this role, the prosecutor has 
the overriding responsibility not simply to convict the guilty but to protect the 
inn~cent.~' The duty to truth also derives from the prosecutor's constitutional 
obligation not to use false evidence or to suppress material evidence favorable to the 
defendant.21 The duty to truth also arises from various ethical strictures that require 
prosecutors to have confidence in the truth of the evidence before bringing or 
maintaining criminal charges.22 The duty is found as well in the prosecutor's 
domination of the criminal justice system and his virtual monopoly of the fact-finding 
process.23 More than any other party in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor has 
superior knowledge of the facts that are used to convict the defendant, exclusive control 
of those and a unique ability to shape the presentation of those facts to the 
18. See infra Parts II(A), II(B), and II(C). 
19. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."). See also MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8, cmt. 1 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (('A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
R E ~ P O N S I B I L ~  EC 7-13 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs 
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JusncE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(c) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA 
STANDARDS] ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). 
20. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, cmt. at 3-1.2 ("[Ilt is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is 
to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty."). 
2 1. See infra Part D(B) and Part II(C). 
22. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text. Some statutes explicitly require that attorneys be truthful. 
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 5 15-19-4 (1982) (noting the duty of attorneys to employ in litigation "such means 
only as are consistent with truth and never seek to mislead the judges or juries by any artifice or false statements 
of the law"). 
23. See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LA FAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY KING, MODERN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 1205 (9th ed. 1999) (describing prosecutor's domination of criminal justice system, including 
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand jury's subpoena power, 
early anival on scene by police when evidence is fresh, and natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with 
police and refuse to cooperate with defense); STEPHEN A. SALTLBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 809 (6th ed. 2000) ("[Tlhe prosecutor has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice 
system."); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 8 4:l ( 2 ~  ED. 1999) ("The prosecutor decides 
whether or not to bring criminal charges: who to charge; what charges to bring; whether a defendant will stand 
trial, plead guilty, or enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer immunity 
from prosecution."). 
24. Although there is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 
U.S. 545,559 (1977), federal and state discovery statutes allow the defense limited access to information in the 
prosecutor's possession. See FED. R. C m .  P. 16; N.Y. CRIM. P. L., 8 240.20. However, it is commonly 
recognized that a defendant's access to information in the prosecution's possession is extremely limited. See 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal For Discovery Before 
Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 709-13 (1999) ("Pre-trial discovery in 
criminal cases is extraordinarily limited."); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Wirness Statements: 
Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 65 1,652 (1999) ("defendant's criminal discovery is limited"). 
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fact-finder.25 Finally, the prosecutor, in his role as representative of the government, has 
a unique power to affect the evaluation of the facts by the fact-finder, who inevitably 
views the prosecutor as a special guardian and thus a warranter of the facts - an expert 
who can be trusted to use the facts res~onsibly.~~ 
Part I of this Article discusses the prosecutor's duty to refrain from conduct 
that impedes the search for truth." A prosecutor may impede the truth-finding 
process in several ways: (1) distorting the truth by attacking the defendant's 
character, misleading and misrepresenting facts, and engaging in inflammatory 
(2) subverting the truth by making false statements and presenting 
false e~idence; '~ (3) suppressing the truth by failing to disclose potentially 
truth-enhancing evidence or obstructing defense access to potentially truth- 
enhancing e~idence;~' and (4) other truth-disserving conduct that exploits 
defense counsel's misconduct and mistakes3' and prevents introduction of 
potentially truth-serving defenses.32 Part I also discusses the prosecutor's 
affirmative duty to assist the defense in discovering the truth through discovery 
rules33 and by conferring immunity on potentially truthful defense witnesses.34 
25. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
26. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("prosecutor's opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own 
view of the evidence"); Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 ("It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, 
has confidence that these obligations [to serve justice] which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will 
be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal 
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none."); United 
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1981) ('The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the 
United States Government; he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are those, 
not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is done . . . [I]t may be 
difficult for [the jury] to ignore his views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be."). 
27. The search for truth is generally regarded as the touchstone for the adversary system. See Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986) ("[Tlhe central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question 
of the defendant's guilt or innocence."); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1991) ("The theme of accurate adjudication lies at the very heart of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' vision of constitutional criminal procedure."); Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as 
Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 4 UTAH L. REV. 799, 804 
(1988) ("Simply stated, truth is the sina qua non of justice. If justice is to have meaning beyond that of a hollow 
shibboleth, it must reflect a wise and fair application of truth."); Gary Goodpaster, Criminal Law: On the Theory 
of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J .  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 118 n.1 ("Most adversary system 
critiques assume that truth-finding is the purpose of the adversary system and challenge it from that point of 
view."). But see Barbara A. Babcock Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1982) ("But if the central goal is truth-seeking, why should 'the 
prosecutor, with his greater resources and access to witnesses, not have the responsibility for putting all the 
evidence on the table, including that which is favorable to the accused?')). 
28. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. 
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Part I1 of this Article discusses the source and nature of the prosecutor's duty to 
prejudge the truth. As explained in Part 11, this duty is based on various legal, 
ethical, and practical considerations that require a prosecutor, in effect, to 
preempt the jury's determination by making an informal adjudication of the 
defendant's guilt and the credibility of witnesses.35 Part I1 also discusses the 
methodology used by a prosecutor in malung this prejudgment - by examining 
facts skeptically, rigorously testing the hypothesis of guilt, and having the moral 
courage to decline prosecution when not personally convinced of the defendant's 
guilt.36 Finally, Part 11 describes how an aggressive commitment to truth, rather 
than an agnostic approach to truth, will create a prosecutorial culture that is more 
compatible with the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice. 
Part I11 of the Article concludes that a prosecutor has both a negative duty to 
refrain from conduct that impedes the search for truth and an affirmative duty to 
protect and promote the search for truth. A prosecutor who proceeds with a case 
without being personally convinced of the defendant's guilt violates these duties 
and creates an unacceptable risk that an innocent person will be c~nvicted.~ '  
I. DUTY NOT TO IMPEDE THE TRUTH 
1 The courts have recognized that, as a minister of justice, a prosecutor has a 
special duty not to impede the truth.38 That duty has been recognized implicitly in 
cases where courts have reversed convictions when the prosecutor engaged in 
35. See infra notes 162-87 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 188-226 and accompanying text. 
37. See FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 88 ("[A] prosecutor should be professionally disciplined for proceeding 
with prosecution if a fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to the prosecutor, 
that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
38. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (noting that a prosecutor has "duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction"); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc) (noting that a prosecutor "has the unique duty to ensure fundamentally fair trials by seeking not only to 
convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer justice"), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); 
United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor has ''duty to serve and facilitate the 
truth-finding function of the courts"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.15 (11th Cir. 1994) ("prosecutors 
have a special duty of integrity in theirarguments"); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) 
("lawyers representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first"); United States v. 
Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting 
United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365. 367 (2d Cir. 1962)); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 
(2d Cir. 1992) (prosecutor has "duty not to lie"). 
By contrast, it is generally agreed that defense counsel's ethical duty to represent his client zealously includes 
an affirmative duty to impede the search for truth. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-258 (1967) 
("defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. . . . If he can confuse a witness, 
even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course.") 
(White, J., concumng); JAMES KUNEN, HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? THE ~ ~ A K I N G  OF A CRIMINAL 
LAWYER 30 (1983) ("defense attorney's job is to keep the truth from coming out, or to keep the jury from 
recognizing it if it does."); FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 75 ("[Tlhere are situations in which it may be proper for 
the attorney to give the client legal advice even though the attorney has reason to believe that the advice may 
induce the client to commit perjury."); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 123 n.15 ("Scholars support the 
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conduct that distorted, subverted, or suppressed the truth. In Berger v. United 
the seminal case defining the prosecutor's legal and ethical role as a 
minister of justice, the Supreme Court implied that the prosecutor's duty to serve 
justice includes the avoidance of conduct that deliberately corrupts the truth- 
finding process.40 The prosecutor's conduct, both in presenting evidence and 
argument to the jury, was characterized by the Court as an "evil influence" that 
was "calculated to mislead the jury."4' The misconduct during the evidence phase 
included: misstating facts during cross-examination; falsely insinuating that 
witnesses said things they had not said; representing that witnesses made 
statements to him personally out of court when no proof of this was offered; 
pretending that a witness had said something which he had not said and 
persistently cross-examining him on that basis; and assuming prejudicial facts 
not in evidence. The prosecutor's closing argument contained remarks that were 
' 6 .  intemperate," "undignified," and "misleading,"42 including assertions of per- 
sonal knowledge, allusions to unused incriminating evidence, and ridiculing of 
defense counsel.43 
The prosecutor's tactics in Berger are familiar examples of how a prosecutor 
can corrupt the fact-finding process. The following sections amplify Berger's 
critique. They offer a typology of conduct by prosecutors that distort, subvert, 
suppress, and otherwise impede the search for truth. To the extent that courts 
view the central function of a criminal trial as deciding the question of the 
defendant's factual the courts routinely condemn prosecutors for 
engaging in conduct that impedes that determination and have reversed 
convictions when the prosecutor's conduct sufficiently undermined the accuracy 
practitioners' view that the defense attorney's aim is not truth or fairness, but the most favorable outcome 
possible for his or her client."). 
39. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
40. The Court condemned the prosecutor's commission of "foul blows" that were "calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction." Id. at 88. 
41. Id. at 85. The Court reproduced excerpts from the trial record to illustrate the magnitude of the 
prosecutor's misconduct, and criticized the trial judge for failing to issue a "stem rebuke" or take other 
"repressive measures." Id. 
42. Id. at 85. 
43. Justice Sutherland capped his discussion of the prosecutor's misconduct with this oft-quoted passage on 
the role of the prosecutor: 
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
44. See supra note 27. 
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of the guilty verdict.45 On the other hand, courts have tolerated other truth- 
disserving conduct by prosecutors in order to protect adversarial integrity and . 
prosecutorial d i ~ c r e t i o n . ~ ~  There are also occasions when a prosecutor's duty to 
the truth includes an affirmative duty to assist a defendant in discovering the 
t r~ th .~ '  
A. DISTORTING THE TRUTH 
One way a prosecutor violates the duty to truth is by deliberately distorting the 
evidence. Prosecutors do this in several ways: attacking a defendant's character 
without a valid evidentiary purpose; misleading the jury and misrepresenting the 
facts; and inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
Character proof, as every trial lawyer knows, is one of the most dangerous 
types of e~ idence .~ '  The capacity of proof of a defendant's criminal past to 
skew the jury's proper evaluation of the truth has been d ~ c u m e n t e d . ~ ~  By 
insinuating that a defendant's criminal background makes it more likely that 
he committed the present crime, the prosecutor encourages the jury to find 
the defendant guilty based on speculative, confusing, and inflammatory 
considerations. 
The danger of this tactic is illustrated in Judge Cardozo's classic opinion in 
People v. ~ a c k o w i t z . ~ ~  The defendant, a young optician regularly employed 
with no criminal history, shot a man to death on a Brooklyn street corner who 
45. Truth-impeding misconduct does not necessarily invalidate a guilty verdict. After misconduct has been 
established, a reviewing court considers the probable impact of the violation on the verdict. The evaluation of 
prejudice occurs in one of four principal contexts: (1) harmless error analysis for preserved constitutional 
violations, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (conviction reversed unless prosecutor 
demonstrates that error harmless beyond reasonable doubt); (2) harmless error analysis for preserved 
unconstitutional violations, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,764-65 (1946) (conviction reversed if 
defendant demonstrates that error had "substantial influence" on the verdict or leaves one in "grave doubt" 
whether it had such effect); (3) plain error analysis for both constitutional and unconstitutional violations when 
the violation was not objected to, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (reversal justified 
only if error is "obvious," "affect[s] substantial rights," and "seriously affect[s] the fairness integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings."); and (4) collateral review of preserved constitutional violations, see Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (unconstitutional Korreakos standard applicable to evaluate 
constitutional error on habeas corpus review). 
46. See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra notes 144-61 and accompanying text. 
48. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, VIDENCE 8 57 (1904) ("The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not 
because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is 
caught, is a tendency which cannot help'operating with any jury, in or out of court.") 
49. See HARRY KALVEN, JR & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966) (when a defendant's criminal 
record is known and the prosecution's case has weaknesses, the defendant's chances of acquittal are 38%, 
compared to 65% otherwise). 
50. 172 N.E. 466 (N.Y. 1930). 
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had insulted his wife. The killing was not disputed. The central question was 
the defendant's state of mind. From the evidence, the jury was free to choose 
from a range of culpable mental states. Judge Cardozo explained how the 
jury's delicate analysis could be (and was) manipulated by prosecutorial 
overreaching: 
With only the rough and ready tests supplied by their experience of life, the 
jurors were to look into the workings of another's mind, and discover its 
capacities and disabilities, its urges and inhibitions, in moments of intense 
excitement. Delicate enough and subtle is the inquiry, even in the most 
favorable conditions, with every warping influence excluded. There must be no 
blumng of the issues by evidence illegally admitted and carrying with it in its 
admission an appeal to prejudice and passion.51 
The conviction was reversed because throughout the trial the prosecutor 
repeatedly sought to portray the defendant as a man of dangerous propensities 
who, because of those qualities, was more likely to kill with a premeditated 
design than a man of irreproachable ~haracter.~' 
Prosecutors employ a variety of tactics to unfairly impugn a defendant's 
~haracter.'~ They accomplish this directly through proof of prior crirnina~ity,~~ 
by innuendo during the examination of witnesses about the defendant's crim- 
5 1. Id. at 467. 
52. The prosecutor elicited proof that the defendant owned several guns and other weapons, 
none of which were alleged to have been used in the killing, to suggest that the defendant was a 
"desperate type of criminal, a criminal affected with a murderous propensity." Id. at 468. As in 
Zuckowirz, courts are especially sensitive to insinuations of bad character as skewing the fact-finding 
process, and convictions are often reversed. See, e.g., United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (prosecutor offers evidence that defendant associated with persons who were convicted 
of similar fraudulent behavior); United States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor 
offers evidence of defendant's molestation of stepdaughter); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658 
(8th Cir. 1997) (prior sexual assaults); United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(prior murder); United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (prior similar sexual 
crimes); United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992 (1st Cir. 1996) (prior arson); People v. Terry, 728 
N.E.2d 669 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (prosecutor insinuates that defendant was member of gang that 
was dealing drugs); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1995) (deviant sexual 
behavior). 
53. This is not to say that evidence of a defendant's criminal past may not be used to prove guilt. Such 
evidence is often relevant and admissible as an aid in arriving at the truth. Prosecutors have broad leeway to use 
a defendant's criminal background for a proper purpose, such as impeachment, see FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 609, or 
when relevant to an issue in the case, such as intent, motive, identity, knowledge, opportunity, common scheme 
or plan, or absence of mistake. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
54. Common techniques include seeking to impeach the defendant's testimony by asking about prior 
convictions bearing no relationship to credibility, misrepresenting the nature or seriousness of the 
convictions, or insinuating that prior guilt is a basis for inferring present guilt. For discussion of the 
prosecutor's misuse of prior convictions, see BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT 
5 2-5(c), at 164-66 (1997). 
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inal past,55 and by proving that the defendant associates with undesirable 
persons.56 
2. MISLEADING AND MISREPRESENTING 
Misleading conduct distorts the search for truth by confusing the jury's rational 
view of the e~idence. '~ The potential for a prosecutor to mislead inheres in 
virtually every phase of the trial, from offering evidence, questioning witnesses, 
making comments, and presenting  argument^.'^ Since the jury is likely to place 
great trust in the prosecutor as the embodiment of law enforcement, the 
prosecutor's ability to mislead the jury is greatly enhan~ed.'~ 
Familiar types of misleading conduct include questions that attempt to create 
in the jurors' minds damaging and prejudicial innuendos without any basis in 
fact,60 personal assurances that the witness is telling the truth,6' allusions to the 
55. Common techniques include eliciting testimony that witnesses identified the defendant from "mug 
books" in police files, introducing police reports containing the defendant's criminal identification number, 
proving that the defendant used aliases or variations of his surname to insinuate prior involvement with law 
enforcement, or eliciting testimony containing the unmistakable inference that the defendant is a prior felon. 
See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Keane, 972 F. Supp. 709 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (prosecutor elicits identification testimony 
from witness who tells jury that he was defendant's parole officer). For discussion of the prosecutor's indirect 
references to the defendant's character, see GERSHMAN, supra note 54,s  2-5(d), at 166-67. 
56. Prosecutors try to insinuate a defendant's guilt by proving that he associates with other persons who are 
. involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor elicits that 
defendant who was accused of falsifying odometer readings on vehicle titles had previously done title work for 
several other car dealers who were subsequently convicted of odometer fraud); People v. Teny, 728 N.E.2d 669 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (prosecutor insinuates that defendant was member of gang that was dealing drugs and that 
shooting occurred on block where there was frequent drug dealing). See GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 2-5(b), at 
162-64. 
57. A prosecutor has "a special duty not to mislead." See Myerson, 18 F.3d at 162 n.10 (quoting United States 
v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
58. Misleading conduct is so pervasive that it defies neat categorization. Such conduct can range from using 
a distorted chart that inaccurately depicts the organization of a drug conipiracy, see United States v. Taylor, 210 
F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2000), to "staging" a courtroom identification by coaching witnesses about the seating 
arrangements in the courtroom, see United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994), to eliciting on 
cross-examination that a defense expert had previously testified for the defense in several notorious and highly 
publicized murder cases, see State v. Blasus, 445 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1989), to making deliberately false 
statements to mislead the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Davis v. Zant, 36 
F.3d 1538 (I lth Cir. 1994); Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315; Walker, 974 F.2d 293; United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 
1308 (7th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of a prosecutor's use of false and misleading evidence and 
misrepresentations, see generally GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-4, at 143-61. 
59. See supra note 26. 
60. Prosecutors have insinuated without any supporting proof that the defendant has a criminal record, see 
Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1992), a sordid background, see United States v. Hughes, 658 F.2d 
317 (5th Cir. 1981). and engaged in criminal conduct similar to the crime presently charged. See United States v. 
Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992 (1st Cir. 1996). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54,s 2-4(c)(2), at 147-48. 
61. See United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor asks rhetorically whether 
government agents would risk careers by getting on witness stand and committing pe jury); United States v. 
Dispoz-0-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 1999) (prosecutor insinuates that he has information confirming 
that witnesses told the truth); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor insinuates that 
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validation of a witness's credibility by experts,62 attempts to bolster a witness's 
credibility by refeiences to a witness's willingness to take a polygraph test,63 
proof that accomplices or codefendants were c ~ n v i c t e d , ~ ~  forcing defense 
witnesses to characterize the testimony of prosecution witnesses as false,65 
references to a witness's prior invocation of a privilege to refuse to testify,66 and 
references to withdrawn guilty pleas.67 
Reversible misconduct also can take the form of comments, questions, and 
arguments that misleadingly suggest that a defendant's reliance upon his 
constitutional rights is evidence of guilt. For example, a prosecutor unconstitution- 
ally misleads the jury when he tries to impeach a defendant who has offered at 
trial an innocent explanation for his conduct by insinuating that the defendant's 
failure to tell the police the exculpatory account after being given Miranda 
warnings following his arrest suggests that his testimony was a fabrication 
he was not willing to deal with cooperating witness until he believed her story). See GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 
5 2-8(c)(l), at 190-91. 
62. It is improper to elicit expert testimony that endorses the credibility of the complaining witness, See 
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (improper to elicit from pediatrician an unqualified 
opinion that girls were sexually abused), that expresses an opinion on the defendant's guilt, see State v. Leggett, 
664 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1995) (opinion that complaining witness was telling the truth), or that the defendant is guilty 
of abuse. See Smith v. State, 674 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (opinion that defendant is guilty of abuse). 
See GERSHMAN, supra note 54,s 5-4(i), at 334-36. 
63. It is error to elicit testimony that the defendant failed a lie-detector test, see United States v. Brevard, 739 
F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984), a key witness passed the test, see People v. Daniels, 650 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995), a witness was administered the test, see State v. Kilpatrick, 578 P.2d 1147 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), and a 
witness was willing or unwilling to take the test. See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981). See 
also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 5 2-4(c)(4), at 148-49. 
64. See United States v. Carraway, 108 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 1997); Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992; United States v. 
Blandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993). Courts 
typically allow prosecutors to introduce testimony of guilty pleas of co-conspirators who testify for the 
government to explain the context for their cooperation. See United States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1991). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 
5 2-4(c)(6), at 150-5 1. 
65. See United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221,224 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is not the place of one witness to draw 
conclusions about, or cast aspersions upon another witness's veracity. The 'was-the-witness-lying' question 
framed by the prosecutor in this case was of that stripe. It should never have been posed."). The prejudice is 
aggravated when a defendant in order to maintain his innocence is forced to characterize the testimony of police 
officers as lies. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59, 
64 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 
5 2-4(c)(7), at 151. 
66. Such questions are usually irrelevant, and can distort the jury's evaluation of the witness's credibility by 
suggesting that the witness was hiding the truth. See Gmnewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (improper 
to ask witness whether he invoked Fifth Amendment privilege before grand jury). See also GERSHMAN, supra 
note 54, 5 2-4(c)(8), at 151. 
67. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(6). It is usually reversible error for a prosecutor to 
introduce evidence that a defendant had previously entered and withdrawn a guilty plea in the same case. See 
Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1993). It is improper for a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant 
about a previously entered and withdrawn guilty plea. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). See 
also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-4(c)(5), at 150. 
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concocted specially for the A prosecutor similarly engages in unconstitu- 
tionally misleading behavior when he asks a jury to conclude that a defendant is 
guilty because he failed to testify.69 Prosecutors also try to mislead by asking the 
jury to draw inculpatory conclusions from a defendant's assertion of other rights, 
such as obtaining an attorney following his arrest,70 refusing to allow the police 
to conduct a ~ea rch ,~ '  or relying on other rights.72 
A prosecutor also distorts the jury's analysis of the facts when he deliberately 
encourages the jury to draw false or exaggerated conclusions by misrepresenting 
68. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,617 (1976) (fundamentally unfair for prosecutors to use a defendant's 
post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings as a basis for impeachment because such silence is 
"insolubly ambiguous" and it is therefore misleading for a prosecutor to suggest that it shows a guilty mind). 
However, it is not misleading for a prosecutor to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence after the 
defendant tries to give the jury the impression that he cooperated with the police. Id. at 619 n.11. See, e.g., 
United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1999) (no violation where prosecutor elicited evidence of 
defendant's post-arrest silence for purpose of rebutting defendant's claim that he stood ready to cooperate all 
along). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 5 2-7(a), at 180-83. 
69. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (unconstitutionally misleading for prosecutor to ask jury to 
infer guilt based on defendant's decision not to testify on theory that if defendant was innocent and had nothing 
to hide he would have testified). Courts closely scrutinize unambiguous references to a defendant's failure to 
testify. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 757 (1st Cir. 1994) ("They're still running and hiding 
today. The time has come for them to stop running and stop hiding."). Prosecutors therefore try to suggest the 
point more subtly, by using words such as "uncontradicted," "unexplained," "undenied," and other rhetorical 
devices. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir. 1997) (prosecutor commits 
"egregious" misconduct by "rhetorical flourishes" designed to focus jury's attention on defendant's failure to 
testify); United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (court criticizes U.S. Department of Justice 
brochure of instructions to United States Attorneys advising that it is proper to tell jury that "evidence is 
'uncontradicted' or ' u~e fu ted '  in a nondefense case."). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 5 4 , s  2-7(b), at 183-84. 
70. See United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428;443 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Collins, 528 N.Y.S.2d 41 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54 , s  2-7(d), at 185-86. 
71. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Rapanos, 895 F. Supp. 165 
(E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd, 115 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1997); State v. Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
Bur see United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the prosecutor properly 
introduced proof of the defendant's refusal to consent to a search "not to impute guilty knowledge to 
[defendant], but for the proper purpose of establishing dominion and control over the premises where a large 
part of the cocaine was found"); United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the 
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search of his vehicle was a fair 
response to the defendant's claim that contraband was planted by police). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 
2-7(d), at 185-86. 
72. See State v. Shinn, 704 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the prosecutor impermissibly 
burdened the defendant's right to testify by insinuating that the defendant testified only because he believed the 
government's case was so strong that he had to give the jury a story for otherwise he would have been found 
guilty); State v. Cassidy, 672 A.2d 899 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was 
violated when the prosecution commented that the defendant's presence at trial allowed him to "doctor up" his 
testimony after hearing testimony of other witnesses), overruled by State v. Alexander, 755 A.2d 868, 874-75 
(Conn. 2000) (holding that prosecutor violated no federal constitutional rights by commenting on defendant's 
presence at trial and accompanying opportunity to fabricate or tailor his testimony). But see Portuondo v. Agard, 
529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding that the prosecutor did not violate the federal constitution by arguing to the jury that 
the defendant's testimony should be disbelieved because his presence at trial gave him unique opportunity to 
tailor his testimony to that of all the other witnesses). 
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the evidence,73 or by alluding to facts claimed to be known by the prosecutor but 
not revealed during the The potential to mislead is especially enhanced 
because the prosecutor's prestige and standing as a law enforcement expert make 
his representations presumptively reliable." Thus, prosecutors have alluded to 
unproved private conversations with witnesses or the defendant,76 gratuitously 
explained why evidence could not be i n t r ~ d u c e d , ~ ~  suggested that facts were 
already authoritatively determined,78 and referred to unused inculpatory evi- 
d e n ~ e . ~ ~  
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (misrepresenting the facts to connect the defendant to the 
murder of a young girl by arguing that the defendant's undershorts were stained with blood although the 
prosecutor knew they were actually stained with paint); United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that the prosecutor falsely represented that government informant had convicted twenty-three other 
people); Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the prosecutor struck a "foul blow" 
when he misrepresented that the defendant failed to refute the government's version of events when he knew 
that the defendant had been officially cleared of charges after he passed a polygraph test). See also GERSHMAN, 
supra note 54,§,2-4(d)(2), at 154-55. 
74. See, e.g., United States v. Maddox, 156 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing how the prosecutor told 
the jury what uncalled witnesses would have said regarding what happened to crucial evidence); State v. Evans, 
593 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1999) (explaining that the prosecutor bolstered informer's identification by stating, 
without basis in evidence, that the identification was recorded on tape); State v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 1184 (Ariz. 
1998) (stating the prosecutor's argument that the expert changed his opinion after being hired by defense and 
that another expert fabricated the diagnosis in exchange for money from the defense); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 
629 N.E.2d 999 (Mass. 1994) (mentioning the prosecutor's argument that the police officers would not put their 
pensions on the line by testifying falsely, although there was no evidence to show what impact the false 
testimony would have on their pensions). Prosecutors occasionally make opening arguments that refer to 
matters that are not provable or that the prosecutor does not prove. Convictions are reversed when the prejudice 
is serious and the prosecutor acted in bad faith. See United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 
1997)(concluding that the prosecutor's failure to prove an assertion in the opening statement that the defendant 
committed another murder was severe misconduct and potentially prejudicial but that there was no evidence of 
bad faith); Alexander v. State, 509 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the prosecutor's false promise in the 
opening statement to prove a fact without any subsequent attempt to introduce evidence supporting the alleged 
fact requires a reversal unless the prosecutor makes an affirmative showing of good faith). See also GERSHMAN, 
supra note 54, 5 2-4(d), at 152-57. 
75. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
76. For private conversations with witnesses, see United States v. Wiley, 534 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Hoskins, 446 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1971). For private conversations with the defendant, see United States 
v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585,593 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Vann, 388 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
77. See United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the prosecutor made an 
allusion to evidence that had previously been excluded); People v. Eanes, 350 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1973) (stating that the prosecutor explained why a confidential informant could not be found). 
78. Prosecutors have been criticized for suggesting that the same evidence produced at trial had previously 
been presented to a grand jury that returned an indictment, see United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 
1970), that other trial juries had voted favorably on a witness's credibility, see Wiley, 534 F.2d 689, that another 
trial jury had voted unfavorably on a witness's credibility, see United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 
1993). and that if the evidence was insufficient the judge would have dismissed the charges. See United States v. 
Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1990). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-4(d)(l), at 152-54. 
79. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 (1935) (explaining that the prosecutor claimed inability to 
elicit identification proof because "that is the rules of the game, and I have to play within those rules"); Snipes v. 
United States, 230 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1956) (stating that the prosecutor claimed that he could have brought forty 
counts instead of one count); People v. Emerson, 455 N.E.2d 41, 45 (Ill. 1983) (explaining that the prosecutor 
stated that "we can't tell you everything [defendant] did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe when this is over 
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A prosecutor's appeals to the jury's fears, passions, and prejudices can 
seriously distort the fact-finding process and produce an erroneous verdict." A 
jury typically is instructed to analyze facts objectively and not to allow emotional 
factors to influence its determination. By eliciting inflammatory testimony, 
presenting gruesome physical evidence, or engaging in unduly impassioned 
oratory, a prosecutor can manipulate the jury's prejudices and distract them from 
objectively assessing the proof.8' 
Inflammatory tactics defy neat ~ate~orization. '~ Typical instances include 
name~al l ing ;~~ appeals to law and order;84 insinuations that the defendant 
I will tell you what he did when he was arrested."); People v. Webb, 417 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
(stating that the prosecutor asserted that certain witnesses were not called because their testimony would have 
been repetitive). 
Misstatements of law also can lead the jury to draw false conclusions. See United States v. Alex Janows & 
Co., 2 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 1993) (misstating the law of reasonable doubt); Mahomey v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 
(10th Cir. 1990) (misstating the law of presumption of innocence); United States v. Yancy, 688 F.2d 70, 72 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (misstating the rules of evidence); United States v. Hammond, 642 F.2d 248,249-50 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(misstating the law of criminal intent); United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1026 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(misstating the burden of proof); United States v. Beny, 627 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1980) (misstating the 
attomey-client privilege). 
Also misleading are prosecutorial comments on the consequences of the jury's verdict. Such comments lessen 
the jury's sense of responsibility about the seriousness of its verdict. See GERSHMAN, supra, note 5 4 , s  2-4(d)(3), 
at 15'5-57. Prosecutors have referred to potential punishment, see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) 
(explaining that the prosecutor told the capital sentencing jury that a life sentence never really means life), the 
existence of sanctions other than incarceration, see Fryson v. State, 301 A.2d 21 1 (Md. App. 1973) (explaining 
that the prosecution would place the defendant on probation if found guilty), and the availability of corrective 
procedures in the event the jury makes a mistake, such as appeals, writs of error, pardons, and executive 
clemency. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (quoting the prosecutor's argument to the capital 
sentencing jury that any death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by the state supreme court). 
80. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-5.8(c) ("The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to 
appeal to the prejudices of the jury."). 
81. See GERSHMAN, supra note 5 4 , s  2-6, at 167-80. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (I lth Cir. 1999) (introducing in narcotics trial six 
photographs depicting graphic evidence of spousal abuse); Tenitory of Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154 
(9th Cir. 1998) (introducing irrelevant testimony of defendant's reading habits to portray him as a deviant 
homosexual); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring in postal theft prosecution to the 
plight of poor children, pregnant women, and diaperless babies; corporate layoffs; and Christmastime); People 
v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 2000) (displaying the actual bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of a murdered 
police officer on a headless torso mannequin). 
83. See, e.g., Kincade v. Sparkman, 175 F.3d 444, 445 (6th Cir. 1999) (insinuating improperly that the 
defendant was a "professional burglar"); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (referring 
improperly to the defendant as a "liar" and "con man"); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495,1502-03 (8th Cir. 
1996) (refening to the defendants as "bad people"). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-6(b)(l), at 170-71. 
84. A prosecutor's appeals to law and order distort the fact-finding process by introducing irrelevant, 
irrational, and inflammatory elements that prevent calm and dispassionate appraisal of the evidence. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gainey, I l l  F.3d 834,836 (1 1 th Cir. 1997) ("Ajury cannot appropriately reason that a particular 
defendant is guilty based on media reports of rampant drug use coupled with the fact that the defendant is 
accused of a drug crime. The prosecutor's comment in this case draws upon widespread community fears about 
drugs, and implies that those fears can or should inform the process of assessing Gainey's guilt. In other words, 
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threatened witne~ses;~' appeals to racial, ethnic, religious, and national preju- 
d i c e ~ ; ~ ~  appeals to wealth and class biases;87 and appeals to jurors as parents.88 
B. SUBVERTING THE TRUTH 
In addition to distorting the jury's evaluation of the truth, a prosecutor can 
subvert the truth through lying outright, presenting false evidence, and 
allowing false evidence to remain ~ n c o r r e c t e d . ~ ~  A prosecutor's own false 
statements are a paradigmatic example of the prosecutor's corruption of the 
truth-seeking function of a trial.90 Equally subversive of truth is a prosecu- 
the reference invites the jury to judge the case upon standards and grounds other than the evidence and law of 
the case, and is thus objectionable and improper."); Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 937 (holding that the prosecutor's 
exhortation to the jury to send a message to all police that the jury supported them, from the "superintendent to 
the newest rookie," was a transparent play on the jury's sympathy and loyalty to law enforcement). See also 
GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 2-6(b)(2), at 171-73. 
85. Insinuating that a witness has been murdered, threatened with harm, or bribed, seriously distorts the 
fact-finding process by inviting the jury to speculate as to why a witness died, or did not testify, or testified 
poorly. It also suggests to the jury that the prosecutor's insinuation is based on confidential information in the 
investigative file that was not introduced in evidence. This type of argument violates ethical rules on several 
grounds. It "misleads the jury," see ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-5.8(b), it constitutes an "argument calculated to 
inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury," id. 3-5.8(c), and it "diverts the jury" by "injecting issues 
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id. 3-5.8(d). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 5 4 , s  2-6(b)(3), 
at 174. 
86. Such arguments distort the fact-finding process by appealing to bigotry and base stereotypes. See, 
e.g., Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the prosecutor's assertion that all Sikh 
persons are irresistibly predisposed to violence when a family member has been attacked); United States v. 
Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that the prosecutor's argument that "we don't 
all look alike" was a blatant use of racial stereotyping to counter the defense counsel's argument on 
misidentification); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1503 ("[Bly twice calling the African-American defendants 'bad 
people' and by calling attention to the fact that the Defendants were not locals, the prosecutor gave the jury 
an improper and convenient hook on which to hang their verdict."); Caner v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (indicating that the prosecutor in a highly publicized murder case involving Ruben "Hurricane" 
Carter argued, without any support in evidence, that killings were racially motivated). See also GERSHMAN, 
supra note 54, 2-6(b)(4), at 175-76. 
87. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1990) (faulting the prosecutor for insinuating that 
the defendant could afford to buy justice through the use of expensive exhibits and multiple defense attorneys); 
United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing the prosecutor's misleading portrayal of the 
case involving a businessman charged with bribery as one "about money, tremendous amounts of money" and 
"Park Avenue offices"). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 5 4 , s  2-6(b)(7), at 178. 
88. The appeal to jurors as parents of young children can seriously distort the fact-finding by suggesting that 
if the defendant is acquitted, those children might be his next victims. See GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 
2-6(b)(8), at 178-79. 
89. See GERSHMAN, supra note 54 , s  2-4(b), at 144-46. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (falsifying the amount of money that the 
defendant would have gained from having her car stolen); United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(showing that the prosecutor falsely asserted that the suit found in a bag containing heroin fit the defendant); 
Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the prosecutor falsely stated that the key 
government witness had not confessed to the murder); Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (prosecutor falsely tells jury that 
. absent witness could have refused to testify); Walker, 974 F.2d 293 (prosecutor falsely claims that no line-up 
had taken place). 
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tor's deliberate introduction of perjured testimony.g' In Mooney v. ~ o l o h a n , ~ ~  
the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor violated due process when the 
prosecutor introduced false evidence that a defendant committed a murder. 
The Court stated: "[Dleliberate deception of court and jury by the pre- 
sentation of testimony known to be perjured . . . is inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justicewg3 Truth is corrupted, according to the Court, 
whether the prosecutor actively solicits the false evidence, or fails to issue a 
correction after false evidence has been received.94 Also, truth is corrupted 
whether the false evidence relates to a substantive issue or solely to a 
witness's credibility.95 
Introducing false physical evidence is similarly condemned because it has 
the same capacity to subvert the fact-finding process. False physical 
evidence has included paint-stained clothing falsely claimed by a prosecutor 
to be stained with the victim's blood,96 a chart falsely depicting the 
organization of a drug distribution conspiracy,97 guns falsely linked to an 
arms smuggling conspiracy,98 documents falsely purporting to be official 
records contradicting the defendant's t e ~ t i m o n y , ~ ~  and other fraudulent 
physical items.'OO 
A prosecutor also subverts the truth-finding process when he takes irreconcil- 
ably inconsistent positions to obtain convictions against several defendants for 
91. A prosecutor's use of perjured testimony, although analytically distinct from issues of suppression of 
evidence, see infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text, is frequently discussed as a component of the broader 
rule of nondisclosure of evidence. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
92. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
93. Id. at 112. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929 (4th Cir. 1994). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-4(b), at 
144-46. 
94. See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30 (1957) (indicating that the prosecutor failed to correct witness's 
false testimony that he was not having affair with the defendant's wife, which allegedly provoked the defendant 
to kill his wife). A prosecutor's actual awareness of the false testimony is irrelevant if the prosecutor "should 
have known" about the falsity. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (examining the situation 
created by the promise of immunity made by a prosecutor in grand jury attributing to the trial prosecutor's 
unawareness of the promise). 
95. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of 
a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the 
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."). 
96. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
97. See United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 31 1 (5th Cir. 2000). 
98. See United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976). 
99. See United States v. Steele, 91 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) ("reprehensible" for prosecutor to wave 
piece of paper while cross-examining witness to falsely suggest that paper was official record contradicting 
' witness's story). 
100. See McKinnon v. Cam, 103 F.3d 934,936 (10th Cir. 1996) ("egregiously improper" for prosecutor in 
rape case to display to jury pair of handcuffs having no connection to case); People v. Canada, 550 N.Y.S.2d 392 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (prosecutor seeks to introduce hammer into evidence even though he knew it had nothing 
to do with case). 
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the same crime,'" or changes the theory of the prosecution in the middle of the 
trial. lo2 
C. SUPPRESSING THE TRUTH 
Because of early access to crime scenes and other evidence and superior 
investigative  resource^,'^^ prosecutors have a unique ability to acquire 
evidence that may be inconsistent with the prosecutor's theory of the case or 
favorable to the defense.lo4 To the extent that a prosecutor has exclusive 
knowledge and control of such evidence, the prosecutor can obstruct the 
defendant's access to it and thereby impede the discovery of the truth.lo5 For 
this reason, courts have condemned the prosecutor's suppression of materi- 
ally favorable evidence, or obstruction of defense access to potentially 
exculpatory evidence. ' O6 
101. See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995) (finding violation of due process for prosecutor to take 
inconsistent positions on defendant's role as killer) (Stevens, I., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v. 
Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a violation of due process for prosecutor to maintain 
irreconcilably inconsistent theories to secure convictions against two defendants in prosecutions for same 
offenses arising out of same event); Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a 
prosecutor is forbidden to pursue wholly inconsistent theories of a case at separate trials), rev'd on other 
grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
102. See People v. Calandra, 565 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (prosecutor's mid-trial change in 
theory of the prosecution deprived defendant of due process requirement of fair notice of charges). 
103. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
104. The prosecutor's monopoly of information presupposes that police investigators record fully 
and accurately the information they acquire, and then reveal that information to the prosecutor. To be 
sure, a prosecutor, "has a duty to learn any favorable evidence known to others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police." See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 
(1995). Nevertheless, there is no correlative duty on the pan of the police to impart such information 
to the prosecutor. See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts. Ma'am:" Lying and the Omission of 
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) (maintaining that police 
operate independently of prosecutors, answer to different constituencies, and may not reveal to 
prosecutors exculpatory information). See also Stanley Z .  Fisher, The ProsecutorS Ethical Duty to 
Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons From England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379 
(2000) (proposing amendments to ethics codes to require prosecutors to learn of exculpatory evi- 
dence known to police and to provide guidance on implementing responsibility). Needless to say, even 
the most scrupulous prosecutorial oversight of police record-keeping will fail to uncover police 
misconduct in framing innocent suspects. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on 
Momentum of Its Own, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at A1 (describing police scandal involving fabrication of 
evidence and framing of innocent suspects). 
105. A prosecutor's duty to truth is the same whether he subverts truth by introducing false testimony or 
other evidence, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text, or whether he impedes the discovery of truth by 
preventing the defendant's access to favorable evidence. See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence 
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 11 33, 1 15 1 (1982) ("In terms of 
truth-seeking, there is frequently no real difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its failing to hear 
significant favorable evidence."). 
106. See GERSHMAN, supra note 23, at $5 5: 1 -5:21. The prosecutor's suppression of evidence is among the 
principal causes of wrongful convictions. See supra note 14. 
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A prosecutor has a constitutional and ethical duty to disclose favorable 
evidence to the defense that has the potential to illuminate the truth.Io7 The 
constitutional duty was enunciated in Brady v. M~r-yland. '~~ The ethical duty 
requires a prosecutor to make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense or 
sentence.Io9 The prosecutor's constitutional duty has been interpreted by the 
courts more narrowly than its ethical counterpart, and consequently affords 
prosecutors greater leeway to suppress evidence without legal accountability. 'I0 
Under the constitutional rule, a prosecutor is obligated to disclose only evidence 
that is materially favorable to the defense, meaning evidence whose suppression 
would seriously impede the search for truth."' Moreover, under the constitu- 
tional rule, the evidence must be admissible; favorable information that is not 
admissible ordinarily is not di~closable."~ Additionally, under the constitutional 
rule, a prosecutor can safely avoid disclosure if the evidence is cumulative of 
evidence already dis~losed."~   in ally, a defendant's knowledge of the undis- 
closed evidence, or ability with reasonable diligence to acquire such evidence, 
usually relieves the prosecutor of his ~bligation."~ 
107. Nonconstitutional discovery rules also impose on prosecutors disclosure obligations independent of the 
duty under Brady. By denying access to potentially truthful evidence through violations of discovery rules, a 
prosecutor can similarly interfere with the search for truth. See GERSHMAN, supra note 106, at 8 5:22. 
108. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). 
109. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(d); MODEL CODE EC 7-13(3); ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.1 1. 
110. Professional discipline of prosecutors for suppression of evidence is so infrequently invoked that it 
rarely functions as a credible and meaningful deterrent to misconduct. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 13, 
at 3; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987). 
111. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985) (nondisclosed evidence is material "only if there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different."). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995) (amplifying Bagley standard, 
stating that the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different 
verdict with the evidence but whether "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case 
in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."). 
112. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 (1995) (polygraph evidence showing that key prosecution 
witness lied would not have heen admissible and therefore prosecutor not required to disclose information under 
Brady). But see Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695,703 (1 lth Cir. 1999) ("inadmissible evidence may be material if 
the evidence would have led to admissible evidence."); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (determining proffers and statements made by accomplice witness while negotiating plea 
agreement to fall within Brady rule as long as information "would have led to admissible evidence."). 
113. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (deeming undisclosed items of 
impeachment evidence aimed at government's key witness cumulative and non-material when defendant's 
character already effectively attacked). 
114. See Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2000) ("no suppression if defendant could have 
learned of the information through reasonable diligence . . . [nlor can there be suppression when the defendant 
and the State have equal access to the information."). The extent to which information possessed by other 
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Because of the prosecutor's control of the evidence,Il5 he has the ability to 
thwart a defendant's ability to learn about favorable witnesses, or to locate and 
call such witnesses once they are known.lI6 Denying access to potentially 
favorable witnesses may violate not only the defendant's general due process 
right to a fair trial but the more specific guarantee contained in the Sixth 
Amendment's right to compulsory process.'17 
A prosecutor can interfere with a defendant's right to present witnesses in 
various ways: deporting illegal aliens before a defendant has had the opportunity 
to interview them;"' hiding witnesses and frustrating defense attempts to locate 
them;'Ig instructing witnesses not to talk to defense counsel;'20 and threatening 
defense witnesses with perjury or other substantive crimes if they testify.I2' 
Prosecutors who have engaged in such conduct have compounded the obstruction 
governmental officials is imputed to the prosecutor is unsettled. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972) (information possessed by one prosecutor in office imputed to all other prosecutors); United States v. 
Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (information possessed by police officers who investigated case imputed' 
to prosecutor); United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 1995) (information possessed by other 
government agencies involved in investigation imputed to prosecutor). Bur see United States v. Moms, 80 F.3d 
1151 (7th Cir. 1996) (prosecutor not charged with knowledge of information in possession of government 
agencies that are not investigative arms of prosecutor and have not participated in investigation); United States 
v. Moore, 949 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991) (prosecutor not responsible for information possessed by investigative 
agencies of other jurisdictions, even though such agencies might be part of joint task force investigating same 
criminal activity). 
115. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
116. Aside from denying defense access to witnesses, a prosecutor can also deny access to evidence by 
failing to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Typical examples of unpreserved evidence include erased 
videotapes, crime scene evidence, clothing worn by the defendant, blood, sperm, and urine samples, and 
destroyed handwritten notes of police interviews with witnesses. See GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-2(c), at 
131-33. 
117. See Alan Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974) (arguing that rule of 
Brady v. Maryland is grounded less on general notions of due process fairness than on Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process to obtain exculpatory witnesses). See also GERSHMAN, supra note 54, 8 2-3, at 133-43. 
118. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (although prosecutor caused 
witnesses to be deported before defense counsel had opportunity to interview them, no due process violation 
shown unless defendant makes "plausible showing" that testimony of deported witnesses would have been 
"favorable," "material," and "not cumulative," or that prosecutor's conduct in removing witnesses from country 
was deliberately undertaken to deprive defense of opportunity to interview him). 
119. See United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor, in violation of court order, 
intentionally misleads court and defense counsel concerning knowledge of witness's whereabouts); People v. 
Avery, 377 N.E.2d 1271 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (prosecutor holds witness in custody instead of allowing him to 
speak to defense counsel). 
120. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.l(d) ("A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communica- 
tion between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any person or cause 
any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to give."). 
Convictions have been reversed because prosecutors instructed witnesses not to talk to defense counsel. See 
Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Bum, 550 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1976); State v. 
Hammler, 312 So.2d 306 (La. 1975); State v. Han; 194 S.E.2d 652 (W. Va. 1973). 
121. See United States v. Golding, 168 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor threatens to charge witness with 
weapons possession if he testified); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor 
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to a witness's potentially truth-enhancing testimony by advising the jury that the 
witness's absence indicates the falsity of the defendant's story,Iz2 or by calling 
the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to present exculpatory ~ i t ne s se s . "~  
D. OTHER TRUTH-DISSERVING CONDUCT 
Thus far, we have examined a prosecutor's duty to truth in the context of 
prosecutorial conduct that deliberately impedes the search for truth without any 
countervailing governmental interest except a desire to win the case. There are 
other occasions, however, when a prosecutor engages in what appears to be 
adversarially correct behavior that nonetheless impedes the search for truth.Iz4 AS 
examples, a prosecutor is allowed to some extent to exploit defense counsel's 
misconduct and mistakes, and to make legally proper objections to the 
defendant's presentation of potentially truth-enhancing evidence. The prosecu- 
tor's conduct, although adversarially correct, may seriously impede the search for 
truth.'25 
1. EXPLOITING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MISCONDUCT AND MISTAKES 
There is no clear legal or ethical duty on the part of a prosecutor to assist 
defense counsel to perform effe~tively.' '~ There are occasions when a prosecutor, 
in responding to defense counsel's misconduct, or seeking to take advantage of 
defense counsel's mistakes, may vindicate the interest in adversarialness at the 
expense of truth. 
threatens to withhold favorable plea bargain if witness testified); State v. Finley, 998 P.2d 95 (Kan. 2000) 
(prosecutor threatens to charge defendant's girlfriend with felony murder if she testified on defendant's behalf). 
122. See Golding, 168 F.3d 700 (prosecutor drives witness off stand by threats and then argues that witness's 
absence indicates falsity of defendant's story). 
123. See Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 (prosecutor drives alibi witness off stand by threats of perjury charges and 
then emphasizes in closing argument defendant's failure to present any witnesses except his small children to 
support his alibi defense). 
124. The adversary trial is the commonly accepted device for discovering the truth. See supra note 27. 
125. A recent television documentary described how some prosecutors refuse to allow new testing 
of DNA evidence, even in situations where there exists compelling evidence of the defendant's 
innocence and the strong probability that DNA testing could prove his innocence. Although the 
prosecutor's conduct is technically correct from an adversarial standpoint, the conduct is subject 
to criticism as inconsistent with the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice. See FRONTLINE, The 
Case for Innocence, PBS Productions, Jan. 10, 2000. Congress is considering legislation that would 
require courts to order free DNA testing at a defendant's request despite a prosecutor's objection. See supra 
note 12. 
126. But see FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 88-89 (arguing that prosecutor has ethical duty to advise court when 
defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, as well as duty not to deliberately take advantage of 
incompetent defense lawyering); Zacharias, supra note 4, at 68-74 (suggesting possible prosecutorial options, 
including prosecuting less effectively, introducing favorable testimony on the defendant's behalf, and 
encouraging defense counsel "to shore up his performance."). A prosecutor for tactical reasons may decide to 
assist defense counsel not as an aid in discovering truth but in order to protect his case against a post-conviction 
claim by the defendant that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
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Under the "fair reply" or "invited response" doctrines, a prosecutor is allowed 
to respond to improper conduct by defense counsel in order to equalize the 
positions of both sides and remedy unethical defense behavior.'" Although truth 
may be impeded when a prosecutor attempts to "fight fire with fire," courts 
typically preserve adversarial fairness by allowing prosecutors considerable 
leeway to retaliate.Iz8 But while prosecutors may appropriately neutralize 
improper defense conduct, courts usually draw the line when prosecutors attempt 
to rely on the misconduct as a springboard to launch affirmative attacks upon the 
defendant.Iz9 Such attacks often take the form of character attacks, distortions of 
the truth, and inflammatory conduct.'30 
The extent to which a prosecutor should be allowed to exploit defense 
mistakes, as opposed to deliberate defense misconduct, is less clear. Opening the 
door to a damaging response is one of the risks of trial litigation. Courts usually 
allow prosecutors an opportunity to respond when the defense opens the door to a 
sensitive area.13' However, courts also find misconduct when the prosecutor's 
response goes too far and seriously endangers fact-finding accuracy. For 
example, in Berryman v.  ort ton,'^' a robbery prosecution, defense counsel 
sought to demonstrate that the police investigation was not thorough by asking 
the lead detective on cross-examination why he did not try to locate the defendant 
127. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 ,  1 l (1985); United States v. Tasto, 586 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Reynolds v. State, 505 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
128. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988) (prosecutor's explicit reference to defendant's 
failure to testify not improper since it was a "fair response" to defense counsel's argument that the government 
would not let defendant tell his side of the story); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,182-83 (1986) ("the idea 
of 'invited response' is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the trial as a 
whole"; although Darden's trial was "not perfect," neither was it "fundamentally unfair"); Young, 470 U.S. at 
12, 17, 19 (although not condoning prosecutor's improper response to defense counsel's argument, Court 
advises lower courts to examine prosecutor's conduct in context, including defense counsel's "opening salvo," 
the jury's "understanding" of the prosecutor's responsive purpose, and the evidence of guilt). 
129. Some courts have interpreted Young's discussion of the invited error doctrine to mean that a prosecctor 
may neutralize improper defense arguments but may not rely on them as a springboard to launch affirmative 
attacks upon the defendant. See United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Josleyn, 
99 F.3d 1182 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996). 
130. See, e.g. United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1996) (defense opens door by improperly 
impeaching witness with prior consistent statements but prosecutor's response constituted damaging character 
attack that went well beyond simply meeting impeachment); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d p55 (9th Cir. 
198 1) (defense counsel opens door to circumstances of defendant's prior acquittal but prosecutor improperly 
responds by insinuating that acquittal resulted from corruption); Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109 (D.C. 
1979) (prosecutor uses redirect examination to respond to defense counsel's improper insinuation by engaging 
in gratuitously inflammatory conduct). 
131. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958) ("[Bly her direct testimony [defendant] had 
opened herself to cross-examination on the matters relevantly raised by that testimony"); United States ex rel. 
Walker v. Follette, 311 F. Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("where as a matter of trial strategy a defendant 
himself decides to open up a sensitive area - whether because he hopes to draw the sting out of the prosecution's 
case or because he mistakenly believes he has nothing to fear - he cannot expect the same measure of'protection 
from cross-examination as when the prosecution initiates the inquiry."). 
132. 100 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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earlier. Seizing the opportunity, the prosecutor elicited on redirect examination 
that the reason for the detective's inaction was that the defendant was the 
principal suspect in a separate homicide-robbery investigation. 133 The prosecutor 
could have corrected defense counsel's false insinuation that the investigation 
was not thorough in a much less inflammatory f a ~ h i 0 n . I ~ ~  In addition, rather than 
exploiting defense counsel's imprudent conduct, a responsible prosecutor might 
have alerted defense counsel or the court to the problem so that gratuitous 
damage to the truth could have been a ~ 0 i d e d . I ~ ~  
Prosecutors routinely object to alibi evidence where no advance notice has 
been given,'36 evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual history where no 
advance notice has been given,137 and other evidence that although factually 
relevant is legally incompetent.138 In contrast to a prosecutor's adversarial 
conduct that deliberately and unjustifiably impedes the search for truth, the 
prosecutor's conduct in seeking to exclude potentially truth-enhancing 
evidence based on a technically correct procedural or substantive ground is 
133. Id. The trial court declared a mistrial. 
134. The prosecutor could have elicited from the witness the existence of an ongoing investigation, without 
going into the precise subject matter. 
135. Prosecutors have also been criticized for enforcing procedural default rules to prevent defense counsel 
from raising meritorious claims that counsel through neglect failed to preserve. Such failures by defense counsel 
are often highlighted in death penalty litigation. The prosecutor's refusal to waive procedural dereliction, while 
legally correct, is ethically questionable when there exists a serious and potentially meritorious constitutional 
issue relevant to the defendant's guilt or punishment. See Bright, supra note 14, at 1872-77. 
136. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (courts may exclude alibi testimony as a sanction for willful 
noncompliance with discovery rules). A prosecutor's objection to alibi evidence for defense counsel's willful 
noncompliance with discovery rules is more justified than seeking preclusion for defense counsel's innocent 
noncompliance, particularly when alternative remedies are adequate to protect the government's interests. See 
id. at 413 (preclusion may be abuse of discretion when alternative remedies are "adequate and appropriate"). 
For cases suggesting that preclusion should not he ordered when defense counsel's discovery violation was not 
in bad faith, see Anderson v. Groose, 100 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 
1002 (1st Cir. 1995); Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Portella, 167 F.3d 687, 
705 n.16 (1st Cir. 1999) (court suggests that preclusion of evidence justified even in absence of willful 
misconduct); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995) (no abuse of discretion to preclude defense from 
calling witnesses for non-willful violation of discovery order); United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 911 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (bad faith "an important factor but not a prerequisite to exclusion"). See GERSHMAN, supra note 
54, 6 5-3(d), at 320-22. 
137. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (permissible to exclude evidence based on defense 
counsel's violation of discovery rule); United States v. Rouse, 11 1 F.3d 561, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor's 
objection to defense use of arguably relevant evidence of past sexual conduct upheld for defense counsel's 
failure to give timely notice). 
138. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (violation of due process where prosecutor objected at 
capital sentencing proceeding on. hearsay ground to introduction by defendant of witness's exculpatory 
out-of-court statement, despite "substantial reasons existed to assume [the statement's] reliability," and despite 
fact that prosecutor considered witness sufficiently reliable to use his testimony to secure death sentence against 
co-defendant). 
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legally justified. However, to the extent that a prosecutor also occupies the 
quasi-judicial role of a minister of justice, his invoking procedural or 
evidentiary rules to bar potentially relevant evidence is less clear. The issue 
has received scant commentary. Indeed, cases that discuss the prosecutor's 
effort to exclude potentially truth-promoting evidence address exclusively the 
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 
Thus, in several decisions of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's invocation of 
procedural or evidentiary rules to prevent the introduction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence, although adversarial correct, resulted in a violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right to fair In Chambers v. ~ i s s i s s i ~ ~ i , ' ~ ~  for 
example, due process was violated when the prosecutor relied on state 
evidentiary rules to prevent the defense from introducing compelling proof that 
another person was guilty of the murder. In Rock v. ~ r k a n s a s , ' ~ ~  the Sixth 
Amendment was violated when the prosecutor relied on a state evidence rule to 
prevent the defendant from giving testimony in her own behalf. And in 
Washington v.  exa as,'^* the Sixth Amendment was violated when the prosecutor 
relied on a state evidentiary rule to prevent one co-defendant from testifying for 
another defendant.'43 
E. ASSISTING THE DEFENSE IN DISCOVERING THE TRUTH 
Quite apart from the negative duty to avoid truth-disserving conduct discussed 
above, there is the more difficult question of the prosecutor's affirmative duty to 
advance the search for truth. Does a prosecutor have an obligation to assist a 
defendant in testing the authenticity of the evidence that the prosecutor plans to . 
use against him? Or, does the prosecutor have an obligation to grant immunity to 
139. This is not to suggest that the prosecutor's conduct is ethically improper. The point, simply, is that the 
prosecutor's conduct as an advocate disserves the search for truth. This is merely another way of critiquing the 
role of the adversary system as an effective device to discover the truth. 
140. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
141. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
142. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
143. For a more troubling instance of a prosecutor's invocation of rules of evidence to prevent the 
introduction of arguably relevant proof, see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), where the 
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence that the defense sought to admit to demonstrate 
the defendant's truthfulness. The prosecutor objected to the admission of the evidence at trial, after he 
suggested that the defendant submit to a polygraph test to verify his claim of innocence and made the 
arrangements for the administration of the test. And although the defendant passed the test, the prosecutor 
argued to the jury that the defendant was a liar. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. 
1996) ("He lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility. Don't believe 
him."). Moreover, as noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, the prosecutor's contention that polygraph 
evidence is notoriously unreliable is inconsistent with the government's extensive use of polygraphs to 
make vital security determinations. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 324 (1998) ("The military has administered 
hundreds of thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results for a wide variety of official 
decisions.") (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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defense witnesses who have potentially material testimony to offer but refuse to 
testify on grounds of self-incrimination? 
1. ASSISTING THE DEFENSE W OBTAINING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Although a defendant has no right to embark on an investigative fishing 
e ~ p e d i t i o n , ' ~ ~  several courts have recognized an obligation on a prosecutor to 
allow a defendant to test the authenticity of the prosecution's evidence against 
him.145 The rationale for this duty has been grounded on the Brady doctrine, on 
the theory that depriving a defendant of access to evidence that might establish 
his innocence is just as much a suppression as if the exculpatory evidence existed 
and was suppressed;'46 on fundamental fairness, which forbids a prosecutor from 
denying a defendant the means necessary to conduct an effective defense and to 
cross-examine witnesses against him;147 and on a reciprocal discovery rule, 
under which a defendant should be allowed the same opportunity to determine 
the probative value of the prosecution's evidence against him as a prosecutor has 
in determining its inculpatory character.'48 AS a unanimous Supreme Court said 
in Wardius v. Oregon, 14' declaring unconstitutional a state alibi statute that made 
no provision for reciprocal discovery for the defendant: 
Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of 
discovery which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the balance of 
forces between the accused and his accuser. . . .We do not suggest that the Due 
Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt [discovery] 
provisions. But we do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state 
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The state may not 
insist that trials be run as a "search for t ru th  so far as defense witnesses are 
concerned, while maintaining "poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses. 
In line with these principles, courts have required prosecutors to permit a 
defendant access to evidence for inspection and testingI5O (and to allow other 
investigative procedures, such as a line-upI5') where the defendant shows that the 
144. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 11 1 (1976). 
145. See Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. White, 358 N.E.2d 1031 (N.Y. 1976); 
Warren v. State, 288 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1973). 
146. See Henderson, 514 F.2d 744; State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127 (Or. 1976). 
147. See State v. Boettcher, 338 So.2d 1356 (La. 1976); Warren, 288 So.2d 826. 
148. See Evans v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1974). 
149. 412 U.S. 470,474-75 (1973). 
150. See Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (permitting ballistics tests of murder weapon and bullet); White, 358 
N.E.2d 1031 (permitting chemical tests of narcotics). Bur see People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1977) (no due process right to conduct independent scientific examination of evidence). 
151. See United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1970); Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317 
(D.C. 1977); Boetrcher, 338 So.2d 1356; Evans, 522 P.2d 681. There is no constitutional right to a line-up. See 
United States v. Kennedy, 450 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Calinda, 372 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
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evidence is material to the outcome of the case and a reasonable likelihood exists 
that the results will be favorable. Thus, when the outcome of a narcotics 
prosecution depends upon the identification of a prohibited substance whose 
nature is subject to differing expert opinions, courts ordinarily permit a 
defendant, with appropriate safeguards, to test the substance for weight and 
composition. 152 Similarly, courts will order a prosecutor to permit an independent 
ballistics examination by a defendant's expert when the defendant can show that 
items of evidence such as a weapon or bullets are material to the case and that his 
own examination is necessary to refute the prosecution's expert.lS3 Courts have 
also required prosecutors to provide the defense with other investigative 
assistance, such as the opportunity to conduct a psychiatric examination of 
prosecution witnesses,154 or to aid in locating informants who might provide 
favorable evidence to the defendant. 15' 
Prosecutors have broad authority to grant immunity to witnesses in exchange 
for their truthful testimony, and the prosecutor's discretion in using that power is 
virtually unfettered. 156 The power can be abused, particularly when its use has the 
effect of seriously distorting the truth-finding process.15' The prosecutor's 
immunity-granting power can undermine the search for truth when the defense 
152. See White, 358 N.E.2d 1031; Warren, 288 So.2d 826. 
153. See Henderson, 5 14 F.2d 744; Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127. 
154. See Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966). 
155. See United States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Goliday, 505 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1973). 
156. Statutes typically authorize a prosecutor's formal grant of immunity to a witness. See, e.g.. 18 U.S.C. 
$5 6002, 6003 (2000); N.Y. CRIM. P. L. 5 50.20. Absent statutory authority, prosecutors have no inherent 
authority to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution. See Munn v. McKelvey, 733 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 
1987) ("[Tlhe general rule is that a prosecutor is not empowered, solely by virtue of his office, to confer 
immunity upon a witness."). Immunity is the quid pro quo to compel a witness to answer questions. See United 
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). For Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's controversial use of 
immunity, see Sklansky, supra note 16; David Stout, Starr Drops All Charges Against Two Women, N..Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 1999, at A28. 
The extent to which prosecutors may offer other benefits to witnesses in exchange for their testimony has 
generated considerable attention in the courts and the media. In United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th 
Cir. 1998), a panel of the Tenth Circuit found that by entering into such deals, federal prosecutors violated 18 
U.S.C. 5 201(c)(2), the federal anti-gratuity statute, by "offer[ing] or promis[ing] anything of value to any 
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a 
witness upon a trial." Some courts followed the panel's decision. See, e.g., United States v. Lowery, 15 F. 
Supp.2d 1348 (S.D. Ha. 1998) (finding violation of statute and ordering suppression of witness's testimony). 
Most courts considering the question strongly disagreed with Singleton. See United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 
359 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit, upon rehearing en 
banc, reversed the panel decision, finding that to apply the statute to the U.S. government acting in its sovereign 
capacity would be "patently absurd." See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc). 
157. See United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Chin, 490 
N.E.2d 505 (N.Y. 1986). See also United States v. LaCoste, 721 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1983) ("reprehensible 
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wishes to call a witness who has potentially important testimony to offer but 
refuses to testify on grounds of self-incrimination, but who asserts that he will 
testify under a grant of immunity. Although courts typically defer to the 
prosecutor's refusal, there may be exceptional situations when a prosecutor has a 
duty to grant immunity. 
Where a defense witness is available to testify and the proffered testimony is 
material, clearly exculpatory, not cumulative, and not available from any other 
source, some courts balance the prosecutor's interest in maintaining control of his 
immunity-granting power against the defendant's due process interest in a fair 
trial and avoiding a wrongful conv i~ t ion . '~~  
Additionally, a prosecutor's one-sided and discriminatory use of the immunity- 
granting power may so distort the fact-finding process as to require granting 
immunity to defense witnesses. This suggestion of reciprocal immunity might 
arise if the prosecutor built his case by securing the testimony of one eyewitness 
to a crime by granting him immunity but then declining to confer immunity on 
another eyewitness whose testimony would be favorable to a defense.'59 
Finally, immunity has been used to remedy a prosecutor's distortion of the 
fact-finding process by threatening to bring criminal charges against witnesses if 
they testify for the defense. Although it may be difficult to determine whether a 
prosecutor is acting permissibly or not when he warns potential defense 
witnesses of the consequences of their testimony,160 prosecutors may act at their 
peril when they issue warnings that serve no valid law enforcement purpose other 
than to disable the defense from securing favorable evidence to prove the truth of 
the defense.16' 
conduct" for prosecutor to refuse to stipulate to conversation with potential defense witness ivho refused to 
testify). 
158. See United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that due process requires granting of 
immunity to defense witnesses to safeguard defendant's right to essential exculpatory testimony and right to 
compulsory process); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (balancing prosecutor's 
refusal to present claim that witness a potential defendant against defendant's claim that testimony from witness 
is clearly material, exculpatory, and not cumulative); Virgin Islands, 615 F.2d 964 (judicial immunity available 
when immunity properly sought, witness is available to testify, proffered testimony is both essential and clearly 
exculpatory, and no strong governmental interests countervail against an immunity grant). See also GERSHMAN, 
supra note 5 4 , s  2-3(c)(2), at 141. 
159. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor denies immunity to defense 
witness with "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding process"); Earl v. United States, 361 
F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (suggesting that defendant could be deprived of fair trial by prosecutor's 
uneven use of immunity-granting power); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(prosecutor's denial of immunity to defense witnesses while building case through immunity grants to 
government witnesses denied defendant fair trial). 
160. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
161. See United States v. Momson, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976) (after prosecutor's threats caused 
defense witness to withhold testimony, court reversed and directed that upon retrial, a judgment of acquittal 
would be ordered unless prosecutor conferred immunity on witness); People v. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d 897, 905 
(N.Y. 1980) (after prosecutor's threats drove defense witnesses from stand, court authorized new trial only if 
prosecutor extended immunity to those witnesses). 
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A. SOURCE AND NATURE OF DUTY TO PREJUDGE TRUTH 
Although not articulated in judicial decisions, a prosecutor's duty to truth 
embraces a duty to make an independent evaluation of' the credibility of his 
witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and the truth of the defendant's 
guilt.162 This duty arises from the same sources as discussed earlier:'63 the 
prosecutor's role as a minister of justice to protect innocent persons from 
wrongful convictions; the constitutional rule that forbids the use of false evidence 
and the suppression of materially favorable evidence; the ethical rules that 
require a prosecutor to have confidence in the truth of the criminal charge; the 
prosecutor's superior knowledge and control of the evidence; and the prosecu- 
tor's unique power to influence the fact-finder's determination. 
The ethical codes require that a prosecutor have some level of confidence in 
the accuracy of his case before going forward with the prosecution.164 However, 
the codes are deficient regarding the degree of confidence and how it should be 
achieved. The codes employ several different but ultimately insufficient formula- 
tions to guide the prosecutor. First, a prosecutor should not institute or continue to 
prosecute a charge if it is not supported by "probable cause. 9,165 Second, a 
prosecutor may decline to prosecute if he has a reasonable doubt that the accused 
is in fact guilty.'66 Third, a prosecutor should not be compelled by his supervisor 
to prosecute a case in which he has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the 
162. A prosecutor's duty to evaluate the truth of his case is distinct from a judgment as to whether a j u j  is 
likely to convict. The Justice Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution appear to suggest that the 
probability of conviction outweighs the prosecutor's personal judgment as to the truth of his case. See UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 5 9-27.220(B) (1987) (a prosecutor 
ordinarily may initiate or recommend prosecution "if helshe believes that the person's conduct constitutes a 
Federal offense and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction," 
and "no prosecution should be initiated against any person uniess the government believes that the person 
probably will be found guilty."). See also Sklansky, supra note 16, at 528 (claiming tbat Justice Department 
guidelines appear to encourage the mindset of prosecutors that "it is not their job to judge the truth of testimony, 
only how it will play in the courtroom."). 
163. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
164. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: refrain from prosecuting a 
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"); MODEL CODE DR 7-103(A) ("A public 
prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he or 
she knows or it is obvious tbat the charges are not supported by probable cause."); ABA STANDARDS Standard 
3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of 
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause."). 
165. Id. 
166. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.9(b)(i) ("The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good 
cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist 
which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in. 
exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty"). 
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code provide any guidance as to whether a prosecutor may decline to 
prosecute an existing charge, and the standard for exercising that discretion. 
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accused.'67 Fourth, a prosecutor should not prosecute a case in the absence of 
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conv i~ t ion . '~~  
The probable cause standard is not very demanding.'69 As the commentary to 
the ABA Standards explains, probable cause is substantially less than sufficient 
admissible evidence to sustain a conv i~ t ion . '~~  It allows a prosecutor consider- 
able room for error in bringing a charge. Moreover, the reference in the Standards 
to the reasonable doubt test is ambiguous. Standard 3-3.9(b)(i) allows a 
prosecutor to decline to prosecute if he entertains a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant's guilt, but the Standard does not require such action. The commentary 
to the ABA Standards refers to "the obvious reasonable doubt test," but provides 
no further guidance on the extent to which this test should influence a 
prosecutor's decision to prosecute. 
In practice, the standard of confidence apparently varies widely. Some 
prosecutors, including many with whom I worked and with whom I have been 
acquainted over the years, maintain that they would never prosecute a defendant 
unless they were personally convinced of the defendant's guilt.'71 Other 
prosecutors contend that even if they are not personally convinced of the 
defendant's guilt, they would let the jury decide the issue.17' Several academic 
commentators, although lacking empirical data to support their claim, have 
167. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.9(c)'("Aprosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor 
to prosecute a case in which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused."). Neither the Model 
Rules nor the Model Code offer any guidance on this issue. 
168. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a 
conviction."). Interestingly, the standards of the National District Attorneys Association are more demanding, 
stating that a prosecutor is justified in not prosecuting if she has "doubt as to the accused's guilt." See NATIONAL 
P R O S E C ~ O N  STANDARDS Standard 42.3(a) (Nat'l Dist. Attys. Assoc'n 2d ed. 1991). 
169. See FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 85 ("Probable cause, of course, may be based upon hearsay and may be 
satisfied by even less than a substantial likelihood of guilt"); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an 
Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 680-81 ("An ethical prerequisite of probable cause is essentially 
meaningless. Probable cause is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to 
screen out individuals who are factually not guilty."). 
170. See ABA STANDARDS Standard 3-3.9(a) cmt. ("A probable cause standard, which is substantially less 
than sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction, is sufficiently minimal that a prosecutor should not 
err in deciding whether the quantum of evidence is adequate to institute criminal proceedings."). Of course, the 
commentary neglects to add that under this standard a prosecutor must "know" that the charges are not 
supported by probable cause, a subjective test that is virtually impossible to prove. See FREEDMAN, supra note 4, 
at 86 ("Thus, for practical purposes, there is no ethical limitation imposed upon the prosecutor's discretion 
under the Standards."). 
171. Uviller, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Professor Uviller opines that adopting such a position 
"represents a notable modification of our system of determining truth and adjudicating guilt." See Uviller, supra 
note 3, at 1157. Professor Uviller begs the question. It is my thesis, and that of others, that our "system of 
determining truth and adjudicating guilt" in fact assumes the interposition of the prosecutor to lessen the risk of 
jury error. 
172. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Many prosecutors with whom I have been acquainted over the 
years embrace this position. For a prosecutor's candid reiteration of this view after the exoneration of an 
innocent man who was wrongfully prosecuted and spent eight years in jail, see Jim Yardley, Man is Cleared In 
Murder Case After Eight Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at B 1 (prosecutor defends handling of case, stating: 
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argued that notwithstanding the ethical mandate to serve justice, a prosecutor is 
allowed to proceed even though he lacks a personal belief in a defendant's 
g ~ i 1 t . l ~ ~  Some commentators have even argued that if the proof of guilt and 
non-guilt is in "equipoise" - meaning, I take it, that the prosecutor harbors a 
substantial doubt of the accused's guilt - the prosecutor should nevertheless let a 
jury decide the case.'74 
Whatever the prevailing view, there are compelling reasons why a prosecutor 
should not proceed with a case unless he is personally convinced, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, of the factual truth of his case - that his witnesses are truthful 
and accurate - and of the legal truth - that the evidence proves the defendant's 
guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'75 First, the prosecutor is 
much better qualified than the jury at judging the factual and legal truth of a 
case.'76 The prosecutor knows much more about the case than the jury could ever 
"We live by an adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we believe is credible. The defense's job is to 
poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although it took some time."). 
173. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
174. See Uviller, supra note 3, at 1159 ("[Wlhen the issue stands in equipoise in his own mind, when he is 
honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who 
fairly lays the matter before judge or jury"). However, how does a conscientious prosecutor in such a case 
"fairly lay the matter before the jury?" How does the prosecutor cross-examine defense witnesses? Does the 
prosecutor vigorously cross-examine the defendant, or his alibi witness, to try to confuse them, or make them 
appear unsure or indecisive, even though the prosecutor has some reason to believe they are telling the truth? 
Some witnesses can be easily discredited. Where a defendant presents his mother as his alibi witness, a 
prosecutor need only ask one question: "Would you lie for your son?' Discrediting a disinterested and 
believable alibi witness is another matter. A prosecutor should never allow himself to be placed in a position of 
having to impeach a truthful witness to rehabilitate the testimony of an unreliable witness. Further, how does the 
prosecutor argue the case to the jury? Does he attempt to persuade the jury that the defendant's guilt has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt even though he himself is not sure? What, in other words, would constitute a 
fair presentation of the case when the prosecutor is personally doubtful of the defendant's guilt? And, in the end, 
is manipulating the truth proper behavior for a "minister of justice?' 
175. I recognize that in many cases when a prosecutor has a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt, or 
there is some other impediment to a successful conviction, a prosecutor will avoid putting the defendant to trial 
by agreeing to recommend a guilty plea. The ethical codes do not address this situation. See ABA S T A ~ A R D S  
Standard 3-3.9 cmt. (noting "continuing disagreement among prosecutors" on the issue but taking no position). 
To be sure, a defendant's willingness to admit guilt may remove the prosecutor's personal doubt. See Uviller, 
supra note 3, at 1157. However, the potential for prosecutorial abuse is manifest. See Albert Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U .  CHI. L. REV. 50,59 (1968) (refening to a Chicago prosecutor who 
stated: "When we have a weak case for any reason, we'll reduce to almost anything rather than lose."). In my 
judgment, it is ethically proper for a prosecutor who entertains a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt to 
entertain a plea agreement that has been voluntarily offered by defense counsel. It is quite another matter for the 
prosecutor to try to persuade an unwilling defendant to accept a reduced plea to a crime that the prosecutor 
either doubts the defendant committed, or knows he cannot prosecute because of evidentiary weaknesses. The 
latter situation is ethically improper. 
176. See David Kocieniewski, Attempted Murder Charge Dropped Against Trooper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2000, at B6 (prosecutor drops charges after two new witnesses came forward to support defendant's claim of 
self defense, notwithstanding criticism from community that jury should have allowed to decide merits of 
charge). Bur see Uviller, supra note 3, at 11 58 ("Indeed, should the conscientious prosecutor set himself the 
arduous task of deciding whether in this instance the complainant is right? If it is his duty to do so, how does he 
rationally reach a conclusion? For this purpose, are his mental processes superior to the jurors' or the judge's?'). 
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know. The prosecutor has more information about the background of witnesses 
and the defendant, and the availability of other admissible and non-admissible 
evidence. The prosecutor has spent more time studying the evidence than the 
jury, has more experience than the jury in judging the credibility of particular 
w i t n e ~ s e s , ' ~ ~  and has acquired an expertise in specialized areas of prosecution 
that the jury lacks. 17' 
A prosecutor's informal adjudication of guilt is more trustworthy than that of a 
jury for another reason. Aprosecutor can maintain a neutral and objective view of 
the evidence more readily than a jury. Empirical studies suggest that a jury's view 
of the evidence can be readily influenced by a variety of prejudicial, non- 
evidentiary factors. 179 Ironically, a prosecutor who entertains a significant doubt 
177. See, e.g.. Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL 
S ~ D .  395, 446 (1987) ("There is every reason to believe that prosecutors, with more information at their 
disposal and more experience, are considerably better than juries at judging identification in criminal cases."). 
Juries often are disproportionately affected by graphic evidence or unduly vulnerable to inadmissible or 
prejudicial evidence. See infra note 179. A prosecutor's mindset of neutrality makes him much better suited to 
analyze facts objectively and impartially. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of 
Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM . L. REV. 1695 (2000) (arguing that a prosecutor must possess 
an open, neutral frame of mind in order to make a careful and objective evaluation of the credibility of witnesses 
and the reliability of other evidence). See also infra notes 188-226 and accompanying text (discussing how 
prosecutor implements duty to truth). The danger, of course, is that a prosecutor may strongly believe in the 
defendant's guilt, or succumb to the pressure to win the case, and consequently not evaluate his case with the 
requisite degree of impartiality and objectivity. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 945 (according to a former 
federal prosecutor: "Prosecutors are convinced they have the guilty guy, then they go about seeking to convict 
and do not carefully look at things that are funny about their case."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical 
Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 554 (1987) ("Instead of being an agnostic on guilt, the 
prosecutor naturally assumes that defendants are guilty."). 
178. Most prosecutors would readily acknowledge that they are far more better qualified than jurors to 
evaluate the reliability of eyewitnesses, the credibility of cooperating witnesses, the truthfulness of police 
witnesses, and the suggestibility of child witnesses. For these observations I naturally rely on my own 
experience as a prosecutor, interviews with former prosecutors and defense attorneys, acquaintance with judges 
and other personnel in the criminal justice system, as well as familiarity with legal and social science literature 
on criminal prosecution. The following sources are useful critiques of prosecutors offices and the day-to-day 
work of prosecutors in both urban and rural settings. These sources often, but not always, support my own 
hypotheses about a prosecutor's expertise in "sizing up" a case and evaluating the truthfulness and accuracy of 
his witnesses. See MARK BAKER, D.A.: ~ROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS (1999); JAMES STEWART, THE 
PROSECUTORS (1987); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR; A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1980); LEIF H. 
CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER (1974); George T. Fekenes, The Prosecutor: A LookAt Reality, 7 SW. U.L. REV. 
98 (1975). 
179. See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 232 (1983) (inadmissible. 
evidence and stricken testimony has impact on jurors' decision-making); Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due 
Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 471 (1999) (juries exposed to improper prosecutorial statements in closing argument 
recommended death penalty significantly more often than those not exposed to statements); Thompson, 
Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 (1981) (finding jury more 
Likely to consider inadmissible evidence favoring defense than prosecution); Thomas A. Pyszczynski & 
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Effects of Opening Statements on Mock Jurors' Verdicts in Simulated Criminal 
Trial, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 301 (1981) (suggesting that jurors unduly affected by prosecutor's strong 
opening presentation of evidence); Bobby J. Calder, Chester A. Insko & Ben Ymdell, The Relation of Cognitive 
and Memorial Processes to Persuasion in a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (1974) (finding 
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about the truth of his case may impress a jury with the strength of the case merely 
by virtue of his decision to prosecute. Juries trust prosecutors; they are impressed 
by the prosecutor's prestige and expertise.'80 Indeed, jurors may reasonably 
assume that a case would not be brought in the first place if the prosecutor 
harbored any doubt, and may even assume that additional evidence probably 
exists to support the hypothesis of guilt.'81 Two generalizations reinforce the 
danger of letting juries decide a questionable case: juries usually reach a verdict 
and that verdict usually is guilty.'82 
Moreover, a jury trial under the best circumstances is a last resort; it is an 
expensive and infrequently used mechanism to try to resolve a dispute that the 
parties are unable to settle vol~ntarily."~ To allow a jury to second-guess a 
prosecutor's determination that a reasonable doubt exists may be an unreason- 
ably expensive use of judicial resources that could be better expended on more 
meritorious prosecutions. Thus, when a prosecutor has made a careful and 
objective determination that a reasonable doubt exists, there is nothing left for a 
jury trial to accomplish except to reaffirm the prosecutor's determination by 
conferring the community's stamp of approval on that judgment, or to second- 
guess the prosecutor's decision. But as noted above, there is no reason to expect 
that a jury will find the truth when a prosecutor remains in doubt.Ig4 
Finally, a fundamental value in the U.S. criminal justice system is that it is 
preferable to acquit a guilty defendant than to convict an innocent defendant.lS5 
Given the extensive documentation of wrongful  conviction^,"^ and the concorni- 
tant need to minimize that risk, it is most protective of this value if a prosecutor 
assumes the role of an informal gatekeeper of the truth to screen doubtful cases 
from the jury."' 
that the more arguments counsel raises with respect to different substantive arguments offered, the more jury 
will believe in that party's case); Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & Cathy Caldwell, The Effects of Inadmissible 
Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors - A Moral Dilemma, 3 J .  APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (973) 
(finding direct correlation between influence of inadmissible evidence and strength of prosecutor's case so that 
inadmissible evidence most prejudicial when prosecutor's case is weak). 
180. See supra note 26. 
181. In fact, some prosecutors try to make this point explicitly by insinuating that additional, unused 
evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt. Convictions are often reversed for such misconduct. See 
GERSHMAN, S U ~ M  note 54, 5 2-8, at 186-93. 
182. See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-63 (1966). 
183. As it is, under the draconian regime of the federal sentencing guidelines, the prevalence of federal 
criminal trials is becoming increasingly infrequent. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 933 n.69 (estimating that 
only three percent of indictments are tried in New York's federal southern district; ninety seven percent are plea 
dispositions). 
184. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. 
185. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) ("a fundamental value determination in our society [is] that 
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.") (Harlan, J., concurring). 
186. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text. 
187. This is not to suggest that prosecutors currently are remiss in not screening doubtful cases. Prosecutors 
typically decline to prosecute substantial numbers of cases. Of the 98,454 criminal suspects charged from Oct. 
1, 1995 through Sept. 30, 1996, thirty-three percent declined for the prosecution. See Bureau of Justice 
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B. IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO PREJUDGE THE TRUTH 
To meet his constitutional and ethical obligations, a prosecutor should evaluate 
his proof according to the following precepts. First, a prosecutor should approach 
the preparation of a case with a healthy skepticism concerning the evidence 
collected. Second, a prosecutor should be willing to subject the hypothesis of 
guilt to rigorous testing. Third, a prosecutor should have the courage to decline 
prosecution if he entertains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 
A prosecutor should approach the preparation of a case with a healthy 
skep t i c i~m. '~~  He should not assume that his witnesses are telling the truth, the 
forensic evidence is accurate, and the defendant is guilty. Only by maintaining 
the attitude of a true skeptic can a prosecutor insure the validity of the hypothesis 
of guilt and be able to exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence. 189 A 
prosecutor's preliminary analysis will likely be influenced by the quality of the 
investigation. A prosecutor might reasonably assume that more serious cases such 
as homicides and drug-trafficking conspiracies will probably command greater 
investigative resources and be investigated more thoroughly by the police than 
routine burglary or assault cases. And a prosecutor might reasonably place 
greater confidence in the accuracy of an investigation that employs specialized 
resources, involves close and ongoing supervision, includes investigators with 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1996, 16 (1998). The point of 
this Article is to explain the ethical basis for the prosecutor's screening function, and how the prosecutor should 
exercise that function. 
188. See Uviller, supra note 177, at 1703 ("[Tlhe prosecutor should approach the case handed to him with a 
working degree of suspicion. The good prosecutor - like any good trial lawyer - is skeptical of what appears 
patent to others, and curious concerning details that seem trivial to the causal observer."). The extent to which 
prosecutors approach a case with a skeptical mindset is unclear. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 945-47 
(several former federal prosecutors stated: "[Some prosecutors] get wedded to their theory and things 
inconsistent with their theory are ignored;" "[Aldditional probing makes the case more complicated and 
sometimes more difficult to prevail so people ignore such facts;" "[Iln high profile cases, the pressures and 
mindset of some prosecutors make it less likely that the government will carefully examine lies by its 
cooperators"); Jonakait, supra note 177, at 554 ("Instead of being an agnostic on guilt, the prosecutor naturally 
assumes that defendants are guilty."). 
. 189. A difficult problem might arise in prosecuting several defendants together who though jointly 
involved in the crime, have markedly different degrees of culpability. A prosecutor might reasonably 
conclude that one of the defendants has only limited involvement in the case, or the prosecutor might 
entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilty involvement. However, the prosecutor might also reasonably 
anticipate that this defendant might falsely "take the weight" for the other defendants if his case was 
prematurely dismissed. A prosecutor could attempt to "lock in" the person's testimony either by 
immunizing him and obtaining his sworn grand jury testimony, or through a plea disposition and an 
appropriate plea colloquy that limits his ability to manipulate the process. But see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 
179-80 ("[A] far lower degree of belief in guilt (or perhaps even none at all) seemed to be required when 
the question was whether the subject under consideration should be joined as a co-defendant with one 
whom the prosecutor did believe to he guilty."). 
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considerable experience and selective caseloads, and involves significant over- 
sight by prosecutors.1g0 
In judging the quality of the proof, a prosecutor is aware of the risk to truth 
from the testimony of certain kinds of witnesses, and has a special responsibility 
to insure that their testimony is truthful. These notoriously unreliable witnesses 
include identification witnesses,lgl young children,Ig2 and cooperating witnesses 
such as informants, accomplices, and so-called "snitches."193 The vast majority 
of wrongful convictions are attributable to the testimony of these witnesses.lg4 
The testimony of these witnesses share common risks to the truth; they pose 
190. The structure of some prosecutors offices provides an added reason why prosecutors must be 
skeptical, and alert to credibility or evidentiary defects. For example, the practice in some prosecutors 
offices of horizontal assignments to bureaus instead of vertical assignments to specific cases might impair 
communication among prosecutors about defects in a case until the case is being readied for trial. Defects 
may not be as easily discovered if different prosecutors are assigned to different functions such as initial 
screening, grand jury presentations, plea negotiations, and trial work. And mistakes once made may 
become increasingly difficult to correct as the case moves further through the prosecutor's office on its way 
to trial. See CARTER, supra note 178, at 129-130 ("degree to which segmentation of work on a case 
prevented the discovery of weaknesses" and "discouraged the deputies from learning about the mistakes 
they made."). Additionally, the practice in some prosecutors offices of assigning new or inexperienced 
prosecutors to screen new cases, or assigning these prosecutors to present cases to a grand jury, risks 
creating at an early stage serious legal and factual errors. See Felkenes, supra note 178, at 100, 105 
(prosecutors are generally young lawyers who utilize the office of the prosecutor as a training ground for 
legal and trial experience). 
191. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (documentation of sixty-two 
American and three British cases of convictions of innocent defendants); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF 
S ~ c c o  AND VANZETTI 30 (1 927) ("The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards 
of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and 
American trials."); Jennifer L. Davenport, Steven D. Penrod, & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) ("both archival studies and psychological research 
suggest that eyewitnesses are frequently mistaken in their identifications"); Rattner, supra note 14, at . 
289-92 (claiming that misidentification is the single largest reason for wrongful convictions); Gross, supra 
note 177, at 396 ("eyewitness unreliability is the unmistakable conclusion of a vast quantity of 
psychological research"). 
The recent execution of Gary Graham in Texas came after years of litigation and public controversy over the 
accuracy of a highly questionable identification by the only eyewitness. See Jim Yardley, In Death Row Dispute, 
A Witness Stands Firm, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,2000, at A22. 
192. See Angela R. Dunn, Questioning the Reliability of Children's Testimony: An Examination of the 
Problematic Elements, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 203,203-09 (1995)(describing "widespread concern about the 
reliability of the child's statements" and factors affecting u~eliability); Carey Goldberg, Youths' "Tainted" 
Testimony is Barred in Day Care Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1998, at A6 (discussing several reversals of 
convictions in sexual abuse trials and increasing concern over reliability of child witnesses). 
193. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 918 ("[Rlisk that cooperators will provide false evidence is a 
longstanding, well-documented concern"); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 
97 11.98 (1995) ("the incentives for the defendant to give 'truthful' testimony may also lead him to give a false 
account that he believes - correctly or not - the government would prefer to hear."); Christine J. Saverda, 
Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (1990) 
("The fact that accomplice testimony is presumptively unreliable has never been disputed."); Evan Haglund, 
Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1412-17 (1990) (providing several dramatic 
illustrations of informant frame-ups). 
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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special dangers of falsehood and mistake of which the prosecutor is aware but the 
jury is not.'95 
Additionally, a prosecutor should take a hard look at prior encounters between 
witnesses and the police to ascertain the presence and extent of any improper 
influence. Courts have not been especially vigilant over suggestive interviewing 
techniques of witnesses, leaving it up to the adversary process to expose 
impr~prieties. '~~ Even assuming highly skilled defense counsel able to test the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the prosecution's proof - a basic postulate of the 
adversary system's effecti~eness'~' - the process necessarily malfunctions when 
the prosecutor is able to control and shape the information that enters the process 
and eliminate or polish up information that is detrimental to his case.198 Among 
195. These risks include inherent weaknesses in eyewitness testimony, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218,228-29 (1967) (noting degree of improper suggestion contributing to misidentification); Gross, supra note 
177, at 432 ("juries are not particularly good at evaluating eyewitness testimony and determining its accuracy 
and are not exceptionally careful about convicting defendants on the basis of eyewitness evidence."), inevitable 
fabrications from suggestive interviewing techniques with children, see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812-13 
(1990) (noting "blatantly leading questions," "interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived 
idea of what the child should be disclosing," and failure to preserve interview on videotape); State v. Michaels, 
642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (N.J. 1994) (noting coercive and suggestive interviewing techniques, bias of interviewer, 
asking leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact 
with peers and use of their statements, use of threats, bribes, and cajoling, and failure to videotape or otherwise 
document interview sessions), and the capacity of informants, accomplices, and "snitches," to manipulate the 
truth. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 921 ("a cooperator can manipulate the details of the events without 
arousing much, if any, suspicion and still be believable to a jury"). Various prophylactic procedures have been 
established to minimize potential impediments to the truth from these witnesses. Procedures include cautionary 
instructions, see Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972) (cautionary instruction regarding testimony of 
accomplice a "commonsense recognition that an accomplice may have a special interest in testifying, thus 
casting doubt upon his veracity."); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (encouraging courts to 
give juries "careful instructions" to scrutinize informant's motivation for testifying); United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (leading case requiring cautionary instructions emphasizing dangers of 
eyewitness identifications), corroboration requirements, see N.Y. CRIM. P. L. 5 60.22 (requiring corroboration of 
testimony of accomplice); GA. CODE ANN. 5 24-3-53 (requiring corroboration of confession), and use of expert 
witnesses. See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing expert testimony on reliability 
of eyewitness identification); Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909 (1995) (arguing that testimony by research psychologists about eyewitness 
testimony is necessary to provide jurors education and perspective about eyewitness testimony). 
196. For commentary on the practice and ethics of witness preparation and witness coaching, see Richard C. 
Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1995); John S. Applegate, Witness 
Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277 (1989); John D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation of 
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching. " 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1987). 
197. But see supra, note 14. 
198. For egregious examples of prosecutorial manipulation of a witness's testimony, see Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 442-43 (1995) (eyewitness told police he did not see struggle and shooting, but at trial 
"describe[d] with such detailed clarity" the struggle and shooting that it "rais[ed] a substantial implication that, 
the prosecutor had coached him to give it."); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (after 
cooperator identifies Walker and another person named Givens as participants in a felony murder, prosecutor 
learns that Givens was in jail at time of robbery; at trial, cooperator identifies Walker without mentioning 
Givens). See also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U .  PA. L. REV. 1031, 1042 
(1975) (discussing partisan manipulation of evidence). There are additional dangers when a prosecutor brings a 
case to trial involving the testimony of witnesses in whom the prosecutor lacks confidence. In order to counter 
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the common dangers are excessive coaching,'99 failure of the interviewer to take 
notes in early interview sessions until the witness "has got the story straight, 7,200 
and the discredited practice of destroying notes.201 
Prosecutors should be especially alert to any motive a witness might have to 
falsify. This caution applies not only with respect to cooperating witnesses, such 
as informants and accomplices, but also to witnesses who do not appear to have 
any interest in the outcome of the case.*02 The practice in some prosecutors' 
offices of "polishing up" questionable witnesses does serious damage to the 
pursuit of the truth. Some police and prosecutors engage in Pygmallion-like 
inevitable and unforeseeable defense attacks on her witness's credibility, even the most conscientious 
prosecutor may need to make arguments that impress a jury but disserve the truth. A prosecutor may argue that 
an eyewitness's confidence bespeaks accuracy, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is 
misleading. See Steven Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 
1 PSYCHOL. FWB. POL'Y & L. 817,817 (1995) (research study demonstrating how witness confidence "a dubious 
indicator of eyewitness accuracy"). A prosecutor may argue that an accomplice is telling the truth because he 
signed a cooperation agreement to do so, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is misleading. 
See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1150 (2d Cir. 1978) (characterizing prosecutor's use of 
cooperation agreement as "prosecutorial overkill," observing that the prosecutor often has no way of knowing 
whether the witness is telling the truth or not and that "the promise in the cooperation agreement adds little to 
the truth-telling obligation imposed by the oath.") (Friendly, J., concurring). A prosecutor may argue that a child 
witness's credibility has been validated by an expert, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is 
improper. See Smith v. State, 674 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversible error for prosecutor to 
elicit from expert that child had been abused). And a prosecutor may argue that a confession is reliable because 
if the police witness was fabricating he could have lost his pension, even though the prosecutor knows that such 
an argument is improper. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d 999 (Mass. 1994) (argument that police 
officers would not put their pension on line by testifying falsely improper). 
199. See Bennett L. Gershman, Coaching Cooperators, CARDOZO L. REV. (2001) (forthcoming) (describing 
how prosecutors overtly, covertly, and unintentionally coach false and misleading testimony from cooperating 
witnesses); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the 
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U .  COLO. L. REV. 75, 110-11 (1992) (describing how some prosecutors "steer" 
police testimony by presenting witness with alternative scenarios, advise police witness of what testimony is 
needed, and tell police to "toughen up" certain aspects of their testimony); Damaska, supra note 6, at 1094 
("During the sessions devoted to 'coaching,' the future witness is likely to adapt himself to expectations 
mirrored in the interviewer's one-sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps in his memory may even unconsciously 
be filled out by what he thinks accords with the lawyer's expectations and are in tune with his thesis. Later, in 
court, these additions to memory images may appear to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his 
original perceptions."). 
200. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 961-62 (several former federal prosecutors stated that they rarely 
took notes in initial sessions with cooperating witnesses; according to one former prosecutor, "office lore is 
don't take too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are meaningful to you and no one else. You 
do not want a complete set of materials that you have to disclose."). 
201. See United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). 
202. See ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 
(1999) (an estimated one percent of the population are pathological liars); Kristin Choo, Perjury With 
Conviction: Lawyers Can Use Strategic Tactics At Trial to Expose Pathological Liars on the Witness Stand, 
A.B.A. J. ,  June, 1999, at 71 (discussing wrongful prosecution of Jeffrey Blake, convicted of a double murder 
on basis of testimony of Dana Garner, a psychopathic liar whose bizarre and uncorroborated testimony should 
have been scrutinized more carefully by prosecutors). According to defense counsel, the prosecutor was told by 
a family member that Dana Gamer was a pathological liar, but took no action. Telephone interview with 
Michelle Fox, Esq., attorney for Jeffrey Blake (Mar. 7,2000). 
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attempts to "make over" witnesses who have serious credibility problems, and 
then hide information that would expose the deficien~ies.~'~ One of the more 
notorious examples is the testimony by jailhouse "snitches". who claim that 
defendants spontaneously made full confessions to them under the most 
incredible circumstances but are presented at trial to look like public-spirited 
citizens doing their duty to truth and justice.204 
A skeptical prosecutor endeavoring to fulfill his duty to truth encounters one of 
the hardest problems when he suspects that a police officer is lying.205 Prosecutor 
offices in New York City encountered this problem several years ago in litigating 
so-called "dropsy" cases, in which police officers, in order to avoid constitutional 
strictures on searches and seizures, testified that defendants dropped, or 
abandoned, gambling or narcotics paraphernalia under circumstances that made 
such furtive conduct appear incredible. Many prosecutors believed the police 
version to be contrived, challenging the officer directly: "Do you expect me to 
believe that?'The police, not surprisingly, maintained the truthfulness of their 
account, and prosecutors had no way to disprove the claim.206 
A dilemma with stakes far higher than the "dropsy" phenomenon confronts a 
prosecutor in a murder case that has been "solved by an uncorroborated 
confession. Prosecutors are aware that fraudulent confessions are one of the 
203. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
204. See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 8, at 126-58; Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse 
Snitches: Trading Lies For Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at 1. 
205. See H. RICHAM UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 115-16 (1988) ("most police officers" view police perjury as 
"natural and inevitable"); David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
455, 457 (1999) ("Judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys report that police perjury is commonplace, and 
even police officers themselves concede that lying is a regular feature of the life of a cop."); Joe Sexton, New 
York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al  (reporting on official inquiry 
into police corruption); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967,596-97 ("Every lawyer 
who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is commonplace."). Commentators have 
suggested that prosecutors commonly suspect police of fabrication but do not take any action to correct it. See 
Orlield, supra note 199, at 109-10 (suggesting that "prosecutors frequently either tolerate or, more rarely, 
encourage police perjury at all steps in the process;" one-half of the prosecutors interviewed believe that 
prosecutors "knew, or had reason to know, more than 50% of the time when police fabricated evidence in case 
reports"). Commentators differ about the willingness of prosecutors to criticize police conduct. See JEROME H. 
SKOLNICK, J u s n c ~  WITHOUT RIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 193-1 97 (3d ed. 1994) (noting 
that some prosecutors are "not at all reluctant to criticize police actions" and "it is indeed the policy of the office 
to educate police."); JACOBY, supra note 178, at 110 ("the prosecutor often distrusts and questions the actions 
and motives of the police."). But see CARTER, supra note 178, at 84 ("[Elmpathy, uncertainty, the necessity of 
maintaining trust, and the fear of criticism encouraged some prosecutors to become advocates for the police and 
discouraged most prosecutors from screening out aggressively the errors they perceived in police practices."). 
206. Some prosecutors actually dismissed cases when the scenario was too farfetched, and one office sought 
unsuccessfully a judicial remedy in the appellate courts. See People v. Benios, 270 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971) 
(unsuccessful attempt by New York County District Attorney to seek procedural remedy in New York Court of 
Appeals that would shift the burden of proof to the prosecutor when police testify that drugs were voluntarily 
abandoned). See also Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 693, 698 (1996) (given "widespread willingness among police to lie on the stand," author 
proposes that police be required to submit to polygraph examination when outcome of suppression hearing 
depends on credibility). 
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principal causes of wrongful convictions.207 Not all cases of fraudulent confes- 
sions are readily capable of exposure.208 A prosecutor faces a serious dilemma 
when based on experience and instinct he strongly suspects that a confession is 
false but cannot prove it and there is no corroborative evidence. What is the 
prosecutor to do in such a case? Should the prosecutor remain neutral, and trust 
the adversary process to expose the truth? 
There is no easy answer to this question. It may be the hardest question facing a 
prosecutor who seeks the A prosecutor in such case should be suspicious, 
and should rigorously test the hypothesis of The presence or absence of 
corroborating evidence is obviously critical to a determination of the truth.'" 
And if after such investigation a prosecutor still harbors a reasonable doubt, he 
must decline to prosecute. 
207. See Mark Hansen, Untrue Confessions, A.B.A. J . ,  July, 1999, at 50 (quoting Michael McCann, 
Milwaukee's district attorney: "[Alny experienced prosecutor knows that [false confession] can, and sometimes 
does, happen"). See also STATE OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, An Investigation of the Suffolk 
County District Attorney k Ofice and Police Department 55 (1989) ("astonishingly high" number of homicide 
prosecutions involving confessions (94 percent) "provokes skepticism regarding Suffolk County's use of 
confessions"); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of 
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
429, 455 (1998) (research depicting "numerous examples of highly probable false confessions"); Welsh S. 
White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 105, 111 (1997) (finding that "standard interrogation methods are likely to produce false 
confessions in a small but significant number of cases [and] these cases are particularly likely to lead to 
miscarriages of justice."). One of my earliest recollections as a prosecutor was learning that my bureau chief 
was instrumental in exonerating a defendant charged with murdering two young women by proving that the 
police instigated him to falsely confess, and then suggested the details of his confession. The prosecutor was 
able to demonstrate that several critical details in the confession were factually implausible, and that other 
assertions of the defendant were to inaccurate facts of which the police who obtained the confession were aware. 
See Jack Roth, Hogan Clears Whirmore In Two East Side Murders, N.Y. W, Jan. 28,1965, at 1. The Supreme 
Court cited the case in a footnote in the Miranda decision to support its assertion that interrogation practices 
produce false confessions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,455 n.24 (1966). 
208. Requiring that police interrogations be recorded on tape, as required by Alaska and Minnesota, might 
curb the incidence of false confessions. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,589 (Minn. 1994) ("In the exercise 
of our supervisory powers we mandate a recording requirement for all custodial interrogations."); Stephan v. 
State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) ("Today, we hold that an unexcused failure to electronically record a 
custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a suspect's right to due process, under the 
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible."). 
209. For federal prosecutors, the credibility of so-called "cooperators" may be more problematic than the 
credibility of federal law enforcement agents. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 959 (quoting a former federal 
prosecutor as stating that "embellished testimony" by cooperating witnesses "is the dirty little secret of our 
system"). 
210. See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text. 
211. Corroborative proof is obviously crucial to resolving defects or contradictions in the evidence. See 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 932 ("Virtually all former AUSAs emphasized corroboration as the key factor in 
assuring cooperator truthfulness."). Several state jurisdictions require corroboration of an accompliCe's 
testimony for a legally sufficient case. See e.g., N.Y. C m .  P. L. 5 60.22; CAL. PENAL CODE 5 11 11. Federal law 
does not require corroboration. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1917). Rules requiring 
corroboration of the testimony of complainants in sexual abuse cases have been abolished. See Anderson, supra 
note 14, at 2122. 
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In addition to being skeptical of the facts, a prosecutor should be willing to 
assume an active role in confirming the truth of the evidence of guilt and 
investigating contradictory evidence of inn~cence.'~' As in the robbery case 
discussed earlier, only by such active involvement can a prosecutor confirm the 
truth, reconcile contradictions, and expose serious deficiencies that suggest that 
the defendant may be innocent.'I3 A prosecutor preparing a case hinging on 
eyewitness identification should be conversant not only with legal authority but 
with social and psycliological literature on memory and the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification.'14 Being knowledgeable and resourceful are indispens- 
212. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 940 (noting that former federal prosecutors reported "numerous 
instances where facts were not uncovered due to lack of investigation."). For recent instances of prosecutors 
failing to be alert to defects in the investigation, see Sack & Firestone, supra note 6, at A20 (describing 
"disintegration" of prosecutor's murder case against football star Ray Lewis mostly for failing to conduct 
adequate investigation into credibility of witnesses); Jim Yardley, Man Is Cleared in Murder Case After Eight 
Years, N.Y. ~ E S ,  Oct. 29,1998, at B 1 (describing prosecutor's failure to carefully investigate credibility of key 
witness). The extent to which prosecutors should be charged with a duty to uncover police fabrication of 
evidence depends on the relationship between a prosecutors office and the police department. See James 
Sterngold, Police Corruption Inquiry ~ x ~ a n d s  in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,2000, at A16 (reporting that 
one hundred cases may have been tainted by planted evidence, false testimony, and other police abuses); 
Former State Trooper Explains Why He Fabricated Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at B5 (describing 
scandal in upstate New York in which state troopers repeatedly falsified fingerprint evidence). The often close 
relationship between prosecutors and police make detection of police fabrication unlikely. See supra notes 
199-205 and accompanying text. To be sure, contaminated crime scenes, lost or destroyed evidence, 
questionable identification procedures, and suggestive interviewing techniques impede the assembling of a 
factually accurate and complete case. The robbery case with which this article began was impaired from the start 
by questionable identification procedures, police prejudgment of the defendant's guilt, and a serious 
discrepancy between the complainant's description and the defendant's appearance. 
213. Some prosecutors are unwilling to aggressively investigate their cases to confirm the truth. See 
Yaroshefsky, supra, note 16, at 945 (recounting that former federal prosecutors stated: "Prosecutors are 
convinced they have the guilty guy, then they go about seeking to convict and do not carefully look at things that 
are funny about their case;" "They get wedded to their theory and things inconsistent with their theory are 
ignored."); Jonakait, supra note 177, at 559 ("The natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory 
evidence for what it is, but to categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity."); Louis M. Seidman, The Trial 
and Execution of Bruno RichardHauptmann: Still Another Case That "Will Not Die, " 66 GEO. L. J. 1,12 (1977) 
(prosecutor's "unwarranted confidence. . . was maintained by the simple expedient of ignoring or, if necessary, 
distorting evidence that did not conform to the thesis being propounded."). In the prosecution of Jeffrey Blake, 
the prosecutor failed to interview an eyewitness who could have corroborated the informant's account. 
Telephone interview with Michelle Fox, Esq., attorney for Jeffrey Blake (Mar. 7.2000). 
214. There is an increasing body of scientific literature on human memory, with specific application to recall 
of information by crime victims and witnesses. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 953 n.174 (listing various 
research studies describing how people actually construct memories from experience and phenomena that 
influence recall). As with any able trial lawyer, a prosecutor should be conversant with information that affects 
the credibility of her witnesses. Many prosecutors are unwilling to confront such issues, either because they of a 
mindset that "truth is elusive," or a simplistic, "linear attitude about the truth." See Yarosbefsky, supra note 16, 
at 953. Prosecutors generally know much more than juries about the dangers of eyewitness identification, and 
this expertise enables prosecutors to make an informed judgment on the reliability of their proof. See Gross, 
supra note 177, at 424, 438-40 (describing several instances in which prosecutors took the initiative to 
exonerate defendants who had been mistakenly identified by eyewitnesses). 
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able qualities in prosecuting difficult cases such as those involving sexual assault, 
child abuse, and domestic violence. 
Studies suggest that many prosecutors use polygraph examinations effectively 
to clear innocent suspects or as a basis for further investigative a~tion. ' '~ 
Prosecutors occasionally administer lie detector tests to defendants and wit- 
n e ~ s e s . ~ ~ ~  Using polygraph tests to attempt to exonerate a defendant is effective 
only if a prosecutor is institutionally capable of undertaking the corrective action 
of dismissing the case in the event the witness fails the test.'" 
A prosecutor should always be concerned with representations by defense 
counsel that a client is innocent. These claims are made sparingly so as not to 
impair an attorney's Testing the proof with a hard "second-look" is 
not only conducive to establishing the truth, but also is in the prosecutor's 
self-interest as an advocate. Closely questioning his witnesses - even subjecting 
them to the kind of vigorous cross-examination they might be subjected to by 
skilled defense counsel at trial - also serves the dual interests of assuring that the 
prosecution accords with the truth and preparing the witness for a potentially 
difficult courtroom interrogation. 
Contradictory or inconsistent evidence must be carefully tested. First, by 
failing to consider inconsistent evidence, the prosecutor forms an unwarranted 
confidence in the defendant's guilt that might prevent him from taking further 
steps to ascertain whether continued prosecution is justified.219 Indeed, one of the 
major factors in unraveling errors in cases of mistaken identification has been the 
willingness of prosecutors to notice evidence that another person may in fact be 
the pe~petrator.'~~ Second, a prosecutor who minimizes the significance of 
contradictory evidence will probably not be alert to his Brady obligation to 
215. See,CARTER, supra note 178, at 123 (describing policy in one prosecutors office of "willingness to 
dismiss a case when polygraph examination indicated the suspect's innocence," and agreement between 
prosecutors and defense counsel "that if suspect failed the test he would plead guilty rather than take the case to 
trial."); Gross, supra note 177, at 422,438-39 (discussing relative importance of polygraph evidence either in 
clearing suspects or encouraging further investigation). 
216. See id. at 422 (noting reasonable accuracy of polygraph testing, but also that at least seven defendants 
were prosecuted and convicted despite fact that they passed pretrial polygraph tests). Prosecutors also employ 
the threat of taking a polygraph test as a means of testing a witness's sincerity. A prosecutor can employ the test 
without being constitutionally required to disclose to the defense the results. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 
U.S. 1, (1995) (polygraph results showing that key prosecution witness lied not admissible at trial and therefore 
not Brady evidence requiring disclosure). 
217. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. 
218. See CARTER, supra note 178, at 85 ("[Tlhe prosecutor adjusts to cues from the defense attorney, the 
most important of which is the defense attorney's trustworthiness."). In a recent federal prosecution of a 
wrongfully accused defendant, a highly experienced defense attorney refrained from making such representa- 
tion to the prosecutor, apparently based on his belief that prosecutors hear such claims so often that it falls on 
deaf ears. Telephone interview with Philip Weinstein, Esq. (Nov. 20,2000). See Benjamin Weiser, Right Name, 
Wrong Man on Trial, Prosecutors Admit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,2000, at B3. 
219. ~ e k  Yaroshefsky, supra note 16; Jonakait, supra note 213. 
220. See Gross, supra note 177, at 424 n. 93,438-39. 
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disclose this evidence to the defense.22' Both of these consequences impair the 
integrity of the truth-finding function of the trial and increase the chances that an 
innocent defendant may be convicted. 
This leads to the final quality of a prosecutor intent on serving truth: moral 
courage.222 Such courage is possible only in an office that encourages prosecu- 
tors to be ministers of justice. Prosecutors' offices that instill such an ethos 
encourage prosecutors to discuss openly and critically with supervisors and 
colleagues the kinds of issues discussed in this Article. Prosecutors should be 
encouraged to evaluate a case critically with colleagues and supervisors to decide 
whether a prosecution should be undertaken in view of questionable proof and 
the availability of alternative prosecutorial options. 
A prosecutor's moral courage to judge the truthfulness of a witness may be 
influenced by institutional considerations that discourage either critical evalua- 
tion or the ability to take appropriate action. Prosecutors' offices that are heavily 
influenced by conviction statistics -both to project a tough law-and-order image 
and for leverage in budget negotiations - will probably maintain close 
supervision over individual decision making by assistants, and principled 
decisions that might be perceived as inconsistent with a strong crime-fighting 
image may be discouraged.223 It is much more likely in such a setting that a 
possibly innocent defendant will be required to accept a generous plea offer on 
the eve of trial rather than that the prosecutor will dismiss a case in which he 
lacks confidence.224 
221. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text. 
222. Just as the annals of criminal law are replete with instances of prosecutorial abuses resulting in 
miscarriages of justice, so are they filled with examples of heroic prosecutors actively bent on correcting 
injustices. For commentary on moral judgment as affecting discretion, see Anthony v. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 
48 DUKE L. J. 1157,1242-45 (1999) (discussing prosecutorial invocation of "moral norms" to guide discretion); 
Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 19, 
57-60 (1997) (advocating exercise of moral judgment on "ad hoc basis"). 
223. See CARTER, supra note 178, at 107 (county's control of prosecutor's budget allocation "made it wise 
[for prosecutor] to conform" to county's criticism of unresolved cases of welfare fraud); Felkenes, supra note 
178, at 116 ("[Prosecutor's] future in politics depends very much on his justification for the public expenditures 
used to support his office. The office of the district attorney is under a self-imposed pressure to justify its 
budget."). There is anecdotal evidence that some prosecutors offices stifle principled decision-making. See 
Felkenes, supra note 178, at 117 (according to one young prosecutor, "his freedom to do what he believes to be 
right is restricted by the position he holds as prosecutor"); Alschuler, supra note 175, at 64 11.42 (discussing 
instance of assistant who would not prosecute a case unless he was personally satisfied of the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Denigrated by colleagues as the "best defense lawyer in the office," he left the office 
after his first year). 
224. See supra note 175. By contrast, prosecutors who need not be as responsive to community pressures are 
better situated to make politically unpopular but prosecutorially correct choices. These prosecutors are less 
concerned about acquittals or dismissals than elected prosecutors. Although federal prosecutors offices are 
usually insulated from political or community pressures, the issue of whether to bring a federal civil rights 
Heinonline 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 350 20002001 
Even good prosecutors who strive to do the right thing may discover that their 
quest to do justice suddenly conflicts with the rigorous demands of the adversary 
system. The temptation for a prosecutor to believe that his job is to win is always 
present for people trained in the adversarial ethic.225 Nevertheless, prosecutors 
should resist the temptation. The remarks of Attorney General and later Supreme 
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson should be the enduring ideal: 
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as 
those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not 
understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps 
the best protectipn against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the 
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not 
victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his 
task with 
C. PROMOTING A CULTURE OF TRUTH 
A prosecutorial culture embodying the qualities described by Justice 
Jackson would undoubtedly encourage prosecutors to judge truth aggres- 
sively. By contrast, a prosecutorial culture that advocates winning and 
maintains won-loss statistics not only discourages a critical examination of 
truth but encourages misconduct as Commentators are able to offer 
only tentative conclusions as to how particular prosecutors and prosecutors' 
offices approach d e c i s i ~ n - m a k i n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Such conclusions are based on personal 
prosecution following an acquittal in state court is an unusual instance of a federal prosecutor responding to 
strong community pressures to prosecute a case in federal court that would ordinarily remain in the state court. 
See Amy Waldman, Diallo Family Meets With Justice Oficials to Press for Federal Prosecution of Oficers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at B4. The extent to which a prosecutor is obliged to consider the victim's interests 
may influence how critically he analyzes the case and his willingness to proceed in a doubtful case. Federal 
prosecutors ordinarily have no individual complainants to whom they must justify their conduct, and who might 
arguably attempt to limit the fair but unpopular exercise of discretion. Moreover, the availability of capital 
punishment can be highly distortive of the truth to the extent that political or institutional considerations 
override an impartial and objective judgment of the truth. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art or  
Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 9 PACE L. REV. 275 (1989) (describing how desire to solve police officer's 
murder overrode careful analysis of the proof). 
225. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial:" When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 
GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (unprofessional for prosecutors to "keep tallies and reveal them in 
various contexts: political campaigns, interviews with journalists, resumes, cocktail parties and other 
opportunities for self-promotion"); Fekenes, supra note 178, at 109 (prosecutor's "working environment 
caus[es] him to view his job in terms of convictions rather than the broader achievement of justice"). 
226. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3.6  (1940). 
227. See Bresler, supra note 225, at 543 ("A prosecutor protective of a 'win-loss' record has an incentive to 
cut constitutional and ethical comers to secure a guilty verdict in a weak case - to win at all costs"); Bennett L. 
Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 133 (1986) (prosecutorial misconduct occurs 
so  often because "it works"). 
228. Prosecutors are reticent about discussing certain aspects of their work. See BAKER, supra note 178, 
at 14 (prosecutors interviewed "made a point of keeping the content positive and 'safe;' " "Their political 
instincts dictate a canny caution when speaking to anyone even vaguely identified as a working member of 
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experiences, available studies of prosecutors' offices, interviews of ex- 
prosecutors, anecdotal information, and professional and popular literature. 
Many prosecutors apparently do not view their role as including a duty to 
the These prosecutors are influenced to some degree by politi- 
cal pressures from the community and the victim, and approach a case 
with a mostly uncritical, deferential view of the evidence. These prosecutors 
focus almost exclusively on winning the case either through a guilty plea or a 
guilty verdict.230 Because of political or institutional constraints, these 
prosecutors may be fearful of offending police, victims, or superiors by 
appearing to be too defense-minded.231 This type of mindset, however, is 
incompatible with loyalty to the truth. The following statement by a local 
prosecutor following the dismissal of a controversial murder case in which an 
innocent defendant spent eight years in jail is not atypical: "We live by an 
adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we believe is credible. The 
defense's job is to poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although it 
took some time. 9,232 
the media."). Consider the recurring and vexing problem of the prosecutor's violation of his duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. It would be useful for systemic and remedial purposes to learn why so many 
prosecutors choose not to disclose evidence of which they are aware and which is favorable to the accused. 
See STEWART, supra note 178, at 207-08 (account of dilemma faced by prosecutor in "CBS Murders" case 
in deciding whether to disclose arguably exculpatory statement). There may be a myriad of explanations 
for the prosecutor's nondisclosure, some innocent and some venal. Do prosecutors recognize that the 
evidence constitutes Brady material? Do they rationalize nondisclosure by resorting to doctrinal 
exceptions? Or are they simply acting in bad faith? Violations cannot be for lack of training or supervision 
since the Brady rule is as embedded in the prosecutorial culture as any rule of criminal procedure. The most 
an observer can do is speculate on the reasons. It would seem that empirical studies might be able to 
illuminate this critical area of prosecutorial discretion. Unless a prosecutor faces tough questions from a 
critical judge at trial or during an appellate argument, or from a lawyer in the context of civil litigation, see 
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), an observer is hard-pressed to penetrate the 
prosecutor's mind to learn the reason for the dereliction. 
229. These prosecutors, by implication, would argue that even if they have a duty to the truth, that duty has 
been satisfied by virtue of their confidence in the defendant's guilt. See CARTER, supra note 178, at 154 
(prosecutors maintain that they "almost never 'get the wrong man."'); Felkenes, supra note 178, at 112 ("Many 
[prosecutors] believe that once an accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt has been determined by the screening 
process of the police and prosecutor, which they believe effectively eliminates the innocent, thereby allowing 
only the guilty to proceed through the system."). Bur see Gershman, supra note 224, at 275 (according to 
defense attorney Melvyn Bruder: "Prosecutors in Dallas have said for years, 'Any prosecutor can convict a 
guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent man."'). 
230. See BAKER, supra note 178, at 46 (prosecutor describes "constant pressure to win cases, to keep the 
office statistics of 'guilty as charged'climbing from one political season to the next."); CARTER, supra note 178, 
at 128 (most deputy prosecutors felt their supervisor "particularly concerned himself with developing good 
office statistics"); Felkenes, supra note 178, at 109, 112 (one-third of prosecutors interviewed believed "their 
major function is to secure convictions;" many believed that "once an accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt 
has been determined by the screening processes of the police and prosecutor."). 
231. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
232. See Yardley, supra note 172, at B1 (statement of Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted Jeffrey 
Blake for a double murder, despite obvious deficiencies in the credibility of the key prosecution witness). 
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Because of politics, institutional pressures, adversarialness, self-righteousness, 
and arrogance, these prosecutors may sincerely believe that defendants probably 
are guilty, will tend to overlook or ignore exculpatory hypotheses, and will place 
winning a case above any other litigation value.233 This "conviction mentality" is 
especially dangerous in a prosecutors' office that fails to train and supervise 
young prosecutors on basic norms of prosecution, such as the duties not to lie, use 
false and misleading evidence, and prosecute persons who are not clearly 
other prosecutors' offices, by contrast, view their role as embracing a 
duty to the These prosecutors are less responsive to community 
pressures or the influence of crime victims are consistently skeptical about the 
evidence and resourceful enough to test and retest the validity of the 
hypothesis of guilt and have the moral courage to refuse to prosecute a case in 
which they lack personal confidence of the defendant's guilt. These prosecu- 
tors are animated by a credo that to be a good prosecutor "requires 
commitment to absolute integrity and fair play; to candor and fairness in 
dealing with adversaries and the courts; to careful preparation, not making 
any assumption or leaving anything to chance; and to never proceeding in any 
case until convinced of the guilt of the accused or the correctness of one's 
position. ,9236 
As I have tried to show, a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to pursue the 
truth even when assuming the advocate's role. Most of the time, and rightly 
233. Contributing to an adversarial mentality may be the practice in large state and local prosecutors 
offices of hiring assistants directly out of law school. These young men and women, who lack prior 
professional experience, are suddenly endowed with awesome power, and have virtually unfettered 
discretion to exercise their power soundly or irresponsibly. See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 
(9th Cir. 1993) (referring to a federal prosecutor's serious misconduct, court notes "great danger in 
'untrained lawyers wielding public power,"' quoting Stephen Gillers, Under Color of l a w ,  ABA J., Dec. 
1992, at 121). 
234. See Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1324 ("What we find most troubling about this case is not the AUSA's initial 
transgression, but that he seemed to be totally unaware he'd done anything at all wrong, and that there was no 
one in the United States Attorney's office to set him straight."). 
235. Because prosecutors offices are so very different, there has been relatively little discussion over the 
extent to which a "prosecutorial culture" can be identified, and whether there exists a "federal prosecutorial 
culture" that is different from a "state or local prosecutorial culture." But see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. 
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 CEO. L.J. 207, 238 (2000) ("it may be that federal 
prosecutors, and the offices in which they work, take the duty [to do justice] more seriously than state 
prosecutors as a whole"). Many academic commentators, particularly those who have served as Assistant 
United States Attorneys, when they write about issues in criminal prosecution typically confine their discussion 
to the federal prosecutorial system. 
236. See STEWART, supra note 178, at 354-55 (quoting Whitney North Seymour, U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York). 
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so, the good prosecutor, after careful analysis and active preparation, will 
have no reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt and may appropriately pursue 
the case vigorously and fairly. When he is not sure of the truth, and has a 
reasonable doubt, he should attempt to resolve the doubt. If he is unable to do 
so, and no alternative course of action is reasonably available, then the only 
proper course is to dismiss the case, however difficult that action might be. 
Insisting on prosecuting the case presents an unacceptable risk that an 
innocent person will be convicted. 
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